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I. Introduction 
Imagine you work for a big company that has operations in 
many foreign countries and stock traded on the New York Stock 
Exchange. While reviewing expense reports as part of your job, you 
notice that company employees in Nigeria are submitting 
reimbursement requests for large amounts of cash that they 
identify as “miscellaneous.” You email several of those employees, 
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who all explain that the funds are needed to pay regulatory 
approval and contract award “facilitators” who use their 
government connections on behalf of the company. The employees 
in Nigeria also explain that they have been told by the U.S. home 
office to record the payments as “miscellaneous.”  
You raise the question of the reimbursements with your 
supervisor, who shrugs off your concerns, saying, “We have to 
grease a few government palms over there. Everybody does it. Just 
process it as ‘miscellaneous’ so the bean counters don’t come after 
us.” The payments prey on your conscience, and so you call the 
company’s compliance department and leave a message with the 
administrative assistant, outlining your concerns and providing 
your contact information. Weeks pass, and no one ever calls you 
back from the compliance department. You email the company’s 
compliance officer about your concerns, but again receive no 
response. The requests for reimbursement of the large 
“miscellaneous” cash expenses continue to come across your desk 
and they are approved without questions. After a few more weeks, 
you hear that the company’s division in Nigeria has just begun a 
new, very profitable, venture. By then, you are convinced that 
employees in the company’s Nigerian division bribed government 
officials to get the new venture off the ground.  
You know that bribery of foreign officials, as well as 
misleading accounting of those payments, can violate U.S. law. 
What should you do? Try to go above your supervisor’s head? Call 
the compliance department again? Tell the government or someone 
else outside the company? Nothing?  
Would it change your decision if you might be paid for 
reporting the bribery to the government? Not just a token 
payment, but hundreds of thousands or even millions of dollars 
depending on the circumstances? Would the possibility of the 
bounty change whether, or how, you blow the whistle? 
In July 2010, President Barack Obama signed the Dodd–
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act1 into law. 
The statute, known as “Dodd–Frank” after its prominent sponsors, 
former Senator Christopher Dodd (D-Conn.) and former 
                                                                                                     
 1. Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, 1841 (2010) [hereinafter “Dodd–
Frank”]. 
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Congressman Barney Frank (D-Mass.), imposes detailed 
regulation on the financial services industries.2 Over 2,300 pages 
long, Dodd–Frank includes numerous provisions to help prevent 
and expose fraud and corruption, including measures to encourage 
employees and others to report violations of U.S. securities laws, 
i.e., whistleblowing.3 Accordingly, Dodd–Frank encourages the 
reporting of violations of the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 
(FCPA),4 which prohibits giving or offering to give anything of 
value to a foreign official in order to influence his or her actions, 
and which requires public companies to keep accurate books and 
records.  
Dodd–Frank both increased protections for whistleblowers 
from retaliation by their employers, and created an incentive 
system through which whistleblowers may receive between 10% 
and 30% of the amounts recovered by the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) based on the whistleblower’s tip.5 Pursuant to 
Dodd–Frank, the SEC established an “Office of the Whistleblower” 
to administer the tip system.6  
Dodd–Frank’s anti-retaliation provisions were designed to 
prevent retaliation against whistleblowers by their employers.7 
                                                                                                     
 2. See id. (describing the bill’s objective of regulating the financial 
industry).  
 3. Id.  
 4. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1–78dd-3 (2012) (prohibiting securities issuers, 
domestic corporations and individuals, and any other person within United States 
territory from corruptly bribing foreign government officials). 
 5. See id. § 78u-6 (adding Section 21F, “Securities Whistleblower Incentives 
and Protection” to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934).  
 6. See id. § 78u-7(d) (directing the SEC to establish a separate office to 
administer the whistleblower program); see also 17 C.F.R. §§ 165.1–165.20 (2018) 
(establishing a similar system for the Commodity Futures Trading Commission).  
 7. See JILL L. ROSENBERG & RENEE B. PHILLIPS, WHISTLEBLOWER CLAIMS 
UNDER THE DODD–FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT: 
THE NEW LANDSCAPE 1, 2 https://www.nysba.org/Sections/Labor_and_Employment/ 
Labor_PDFs/LaborMeetingsAssets/Whistleblower_Claims_Under_Dodd_Frank.ht
ml (discussing the objective of the whistleblower provisions).  
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The new rules provide additional remedies8 for employees who 
suffer for reporting violations of the law to the SEC.9  
Although anti-retaliation measures may keep people from 
being intimidated into silence, legal protections from retribution 
may not suffice to motivate people to become whistleblowers. 
Simply protecting whistleblowers from, or compensating them for, 
the harms they suffer in the workplace may not be enough to 
encourage whistleblowing.10 Sometimes material incentives may 
be necessary. As one money manager who claimed to have been 
aware of the Madoff fraud back in the 1990s commented, “[p]eople 
on Wall Street are not Mother Teresas. They are not going to the 
S.E.C. unless there is something in it for them.”11 And the federal 
government has had success with incentives in similar contexts.12 
For example, as discussed in Part V.B, the False Claims Act13 pays 
whistleblower bounties, and the number of whistleblower reports 
                                                                                                     
 8. As discussed below in Part III.A, both federal and state laws, in 
particular the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002, also provide important 
anti-retaliation protection to whistleblowers. See generally Sarbanes–Oxley Act 
of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745.  
 9.  In February 2018, the Supreme Court clarified that the protections of the 
Dodd–Frank anti-retaliation provisions apply only to whistleblowers who bring 
their allegations to the SEC. See Dig. Realty Tr., Inc. v Somers, 138 S. Ct. 767 
(2018) (holding that an employee who did not report a possible violation of the 
Federal securities laws to the SEC did not qualify as a “whistleblower” for 
purposes of the Dodd–Frank anti-retaliation provisions). 
 10. See Norman D. Bishara, Elletta Sangrey Callahan & Terry Morehead 
Dworkin, The Mouth of Truth, 10 N.Y.U. J. L. & BUS. 37, 59–60 (2013) (noting 
research indicating that organizational characteristics and the relative 
significance of the alleged wrongdoing, rather than protection from retaliation, 
inform the decision to report); Miriam H. Baer, Reconceptualizing the 
Whistleblower’s Dilemma, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 2215, 2226 (2017) (discussing the 
intersection between whistleblowing and potential self-incrimination as a 
disincentive to report).  
 11. See Stephen Dugner, Would a Fraud Bounty Have Exposed Madoff Years 
Ago?, FREAKONOMICS BLOG (Feb. 26, 2009, 10:30 AM), 
http://freakonomics.com/2009/02/26/would-a-fraud-bounty-have-exposed-madoff-
years-ago/ (last visited Aug. 13, 2017) (noting the reality of being hesitant to 
report without incentives) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 12. See infra Part V.B (discussing other federal corporate incentive programs 
for whistleblowers). 
 13. Act of Mar. 2, 1863, ch. 67, 12 Stat. 696 (as codified in 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–
3733 (2012)); Infra Part V.B.  
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under the act increased substantially after a 1986 amendment 
made financial awards more likely.14  
Despite its superficially obvious logic, however, the impact of 
the Dodd–Frank whistleblower incentive system implemented in 
201115 is still unclear. Does the Dodd–Frank whistleblower 
incentive system increase the quality or quantity of tips received 
by the SEC? Do those tips improve enforcement of the FCPA, 
thereby decreasing overall levels of corruption?  
Lack of data is a problem for answering such questions. 
Allegations of FCPA violations account for about 5% of 
whistleblower tips under the Dodd–Frank system.16 The SEC 
carefully protects the anonymity of whistleblowers who provide 
tips and receive awards under the program.17 Although at least one 
award payment has been widely reported as resulting from an 
FCPA tip,18 it is impossible to confirm the precise circumstances or 
recipients of this or other awards.  
Moreover, the Dodd–Frank whistleblower bounty program fits 
somewhat awkwardly with other FCPA enforcement mechanisms. 
Because the program is based on informing the SEC of violations 
                                                                                                     
 14. See James B. Helmer, Jr., False Claims Act: Incentivizing Integrity for 
150 Years for Rogues, Privateers, Parasites and Patriots, 81 U. CIN. L. REV. 1261, 
1275–76 (2013) (explaining how the amendments revitalized qui tam cases, with 
“smashing recoveries” for whistleblowers). The 1986 amendments significantly 
increased the whistleblower’s role, as well as the whistleblower’s share of the 
proceeds recovered. 31 U.S.C. § 3730 (2012).  
 15. The SEC implemented the whistleblower program by issuing final rules 
on May 25, 2011. The final rules became effective as of August 12, 2011. 17 C.F.R. 
§§ 240.21F-1–240.21F-17 (2018).  
 16. See, e.g., U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, 2017 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 
ON THE DODD–FRANK WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM 1, 31 (2017) [hereinafter SEC, 
2017 ANNUAL REPORT] (reporting the number of whistleblower tips between fiscal 
years 2014 and 2017 by allegation type).  
 17. See id. at 17–18 (explaining the SEC’s whistleblower protection 
practices).  
 18. See Nick McKenzie, Michael Bachelard & Richard Baker, US Awards $5 
Million to BHP Billiton Whistleblower, FIN. REV. (Aug. 28, 2016, 8:43 PM), 
http://www.afr.com/news/us-awards-5-million-to-bhp-billiton-whistleblower-
20160828-gr35vl (last updated Aug. 28, 2016, 7:35 PM) (last visited Apr. 14, 2018) 
(citing legal sources confirming that the SEC paid U.S. $3.75 million to an 
Australian FCPA whistleblower and contrasting that with the treatment of 
whistleblowers under Australian laws) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review).  
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of the securities laws and the SEC’s subsequent enforcement of 
those laws, the scope of the incentive program is limited to the 
SEC’s jurisdiction.19 Thus, whistleblower incentives are available 
for persons identifying FCPA violations resulting in civil actions 
against publicly traded companies,20 which is narrower than the 
scope of the FCPA. In addition, there has been debate surrounding 
whether and how whistleblowers who are company attorneys and 
compliance personnel can report to the SEC and apply for awards. 
At a deeper level, the program raises questions about the practical 
and ethical complexities of rewarding employees for exposing 
workplace corruption externally to federal agencies. In short, it is 
not entirely clear what constitute “improvements” of FCPA 
enforcement, much less whether the Dodd–Frank whistleblower 
incentive program is making such improvements. 
This Article will look at the whistleblower incentive program 
together with the FCPA. Part II will look at the FCPA itself, and 
how it is applied.21 In particular, it will discuss the importance of 
whistleblower tips in enforcement of the FCPA. Part III will look 
more closely at whistleblower law, including provisions of the 
Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002,22 Dodd–Frank, and the related SEC 
rules and guidance.23 It will focus on several issues that arise in 
the intersection of the Dodd–Frank incentive program and the 
FCPA. Part IV will discuss moral and ethical aspects of 
incentivizing whistleblowing.24 It will consider whether incentives 
decrease altruistic behavior, and whether they are appropriate 
when the whistleblower’s motivation is suspect. Part V will 
examine other examples of U.S. whistleblower award systems, and 
                                                                                                     
 19. See Office of the Whistleblower, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, 
https://www.sec.gov/whistleblower/frequently-asked-questions (last updated 
Aug. 29, 2017) (last visited Apr. 14, 2018) (noting the limits of the SEC’s 
jurisdiction) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 20. 15 U.S.C. § 78(u)(d) (2012). For an excellent discussion of the SEC’s 
jurisdiction in FCPA anti-bribery matters, see generally Barbara Black, The SEC 
and the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Fighting Global Corruption Is Not Part of 
the SEC’s Mission, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 1093 (2012).  
 21. Infra Part II.  
 22. Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745. 
 23. Infra Part III.  
 24. Infra Part IV.  
1104 75 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1097 (2018) 
compare U.S. approaches to international attitudes.25 Part VI will 
conclude by discussing whether the Dodd–Frank whistleblower 
incentives increase the quality or quantity of tips received by the 
SEC and, as a result, whether the incentives improve enforcement 
of the FCPA.26  
II. The FCPA and Whistleblower Tips 
A. The FCPA 
In 1977, Congress enacted the FCPA,27 which amended the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 in response to public outrage over 
corruption following both the Watergate scandal and the following 
reports that hundreds of large companies made substantial 
improper or illegal payments overseas.28 The FCPA applies to a 
wide variety of actors including: U.S. domestic concerns, such as 
natural persons and companies incorporated in the United States; 
U.S. or non-U.S. companies with publicly traded securities on U.S. 
exchanges (known as issuers); and persons who are in U.S. 
territory when they commit a violation of the statute.29  
The FCPA has two substantive foci. First, the law prohibits 
domestic concerns, issuers, and persons in U.S. territory from 
bribing or offering to bribe foreign officials in order to obtain or 
retain business.30 Specifically, the FCPA prohibits the use of the 
mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, 
corruptly, in furtherance of an offer, payment, gift, or promise to 
pay or give money or anything of value, to any foreign official for 
purposes of influencing any act or decision of such foreign official 
                                                                                                     
 25. Infra Part V.  
 26. Infra Part VI.  
 27. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 (2012).  
 28. See, e.g., Amy Deen Westbrook, Enthusiastic Enforcement, Informal 
Legislation: The Unruly Expansion of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 45 GA. L. 
REV. 489, 499–501 (2011) [hereinafter Westbrook, Enthusiastic Enforcement] 
(discussing the background of the FCPA as well as subsequent amendments to 
the Act).  
 29. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1–78dd-3 (establishing the FCPA’s applicability to 
each classification).  
 30. See id. (prohibiting the corrupt bribery of foreign government officials). 
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in his official capacity, or inducing such foreign official to do or omit 
to do any act in violation of his lawful duty, or securing any 
improper advantage, in order to obtain or retain business.31 The 
Department of Justice (DOJ) is tasked with all criminal 
enforcement of the anti-bribery provisions, as well as civil 
enforcement of the anti-bribery provisions against domestic 
concerns and persons who violate the FCPA while within U.S. 
territory.32 The SEC is in charge of civil enforcement of the 
anti-bribery provisions against issuers.33  
Second, the FCPA requires issuers to keep accurate books and 
records, and to devise and maintain systems of internal accounting 
controls that provide reasonable assurances that their 
transactions and assets are properly maintained.34 These 
“accounting provisions” apply only to issuers, i.e., companies with 
securities publicly traded in the U.S.35 The accounting provisions 
work in tandem with the anti-bribery provisions to prevent the 
kinds of “slush” funds that enable improper foreign payments of 
the sort discussed in Part I’s hypothetical.36 The SEC is in charge 
of civil enforcement of the accounting provisions against issuers, 
and the DOJ handles criminal enforcement of the accounting 
provisions against issuers.37  
                                                                                                     
 31. See id. (same). 
 32. See U.S. DOJ CRIM. DIV. & U.S. SECS. & EXCH. COMM’N ENF. DIV., A 
RESOURCE GUIDE TO THE U.S. FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 4 (2012) 
[hereinafter FCPA GUIDE] (discussing the FCPA enforcement landscape).  
 33. See id. (same). 
 34. See 15 U.S.C. § 78(m)(b)(2) (2012) (establishing the internal accounting 
requirements).  
 35. See id. (applying these requirements to “[e]very issuer which has a class 
of securities registered pursuant to section 78l of [Title 15] and 
every issuer which is required to file reports pursuant to section 78o(d) of [Title 
15]”).  
 36. Infra Part I. 
 37. See  FCPA GUIDE, supra note 32, at 4–5 (noting the different enforcement 
responsibilities of the DOJ and SEC). 
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B. Tips Are Critical to FCPA Enforcement 
1. How Violations Come to Light 
Whistleblowers are critical to compliance with and 
enforcement of the FCPA.38 In general, the specter of a 
whistleblower may encourage legal compliance and deter illegal 
activity.39 Whistleblowers who report externally to the SEC also 
serve to expose violations that might not otherwise be detected.40 
In fact, the threat of whistleblowers reporting externally may 
increase the quality of self-reporting by companies themselves.  
Companies may endeavor to provide information to regulators 
before their employee whistleblowers report to the government, 
engaging in a kind of race to report before the window for voluntary 
self-disclosure closes.41 Whistleblowers are often credited with 
reducing regulatory costs,42 as agencies effectively deputize the 
public to investigate company practices.  
                                                                                                     
 38. See Gerard Sinzdak, An Analysis of Current Whistleblower Laws: 
Defending a More Flexible Approach to Reporting Requirements, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 
1633, 1635–36 (2008) (arguing that employees are often in a unique position to 
detect and report wrongdoing).  
 39. See Elletta Sangrey Callahan & Terry Morehead Dworkin, The State of 
State Whistleblower Protection, 38 AM. BUS. L.J. 99, 108 (2000) (showing that most 
state legislatures regard whistleblowing as a mechanism for deterring and 
uncovering wrongful conduct).  
 40. See, e.g., Stefan Rutzel, Snitching for the Common Good: In Search of a 
Response to the Legal Problems Posed by Environmental Whistleblowing, 14 
TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 1, 2 (1995) (explaining how employees can provide the 
information necessary for management and government to improve compliance 
with environmental laws).  
 41. See Baer, supra note 10, at 2240 (discussing the positive effects of 
external reporting). Companies’ incentives to self-report potential FCPA 
violations before whistleblowers contact the SEC are likely to increase now that 
the Department of Justice has made its program of credit for voluntary 
self-disclosure, cooperation and remediation in FCPA matters permanent. See 
Press Release, Deputy Attorney General Rosenstein Delivers Remarks at the 34th 
International Conference on the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, U.S. DEP’T JUST. 
(Nov. 29, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/deputy-attorney-general-
rosenstein-delivers-remarks-34th-international-conference-foreign (last visited 
Apr. 14, 2018) (explaining the FCPA Corporate Enforcement Policy to be inserted 
into the U.S. Attorneys’ Manual) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 42. See Laura Simoff, Confusion and Deterrence: The Problems that Arise 
from a Deficiency in Uniform Laws and Procedures for Environmental 
CASH FOR YOUR CONSCIENCE 1107 
Whistleblowers are particularly important in the FCPA 
context. The FCPA prohibits offers or payments of anything of 
value to foreign officials to obtain or retain business, and can lead 
to substantial civil and criminal sanctions.43 Given the FCPA 
prohibitions and potential sanctions, to say nothing of national 
anti-bribery laws in the foreign countries themselves, companies 
usually keep illicit payments secret.44 Nor is the foreign official 
likely to report that he or she has been offered, much less received, 
such a payment. In most circumstances, the prohibited payment or 
offer is not going to be made in a way that is easily visible to the 
general public or to regulators. 
Consequently, it is unsurprising that FCPA investigations by 
both the DOJ and the SEC are often triggered by information from 
employees of a company offering the bribe.45 For example, SEC 
charges against Anheuser-Busch InBev, which were settled in 
September 2016 for $6 million, arose from misconduct reported by 
a company employee to the SEC.46 For another example, in 
                                                                                                     
“Whistleblowers”, 8 DICK. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 325, 326 (1999) (noting that 
whistleblowing increases compliance without expending additional public funds 
for supervision or detection); Shawn Marie Boyne, Financial Incentives and 
Truth-Telling: The Growth of Whistle-Blowing Legislation in the United States, in 
WHISTLEBLOWING—A COMPARATIVE STUDY 279, 283 (Gregor Thüsing & Gerrit 
Forst eds., 2016) (noting that government auditors cannot ferret out all fraud); 
Baer, supra note 10, at 2235 (discussing whistleblowing’s deterrent effect on 
criminal activity due to the increased likelihood of detection). 
 43. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1–78dd-3 (2012) (outlining the prohibited foreign 
trade practices by issuers, domestic concerns, and other persons). 
 44. See generally Miriam F. Weismann, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: 
The Failure of the Self-Regulatory Model of Corporate Governance in the Global 
Business Environment, 88 J. BUS. ETHICS 615 (2009) (using empirical evidence to 
show that the FCPA has not significantly reduced actual instances of corporate 
wrongdoing). 
 45. See Phyllis Diamond, More FCPA Cases in Pipeline, Brockmeyer Says; 
Some Administrative, 12 CORP. L. & ACCOUNTABILITY REP. (BNA) 851 (Jul. 25, 
2014) (detailing the statement of Kara Brockmeyer, former chief of the SEC 
Enforcement Division’s FCPA Unit, that the unit routinely gets “great leads” from 
whistleblower complaints and other tips).  
 46. Press Release, SEC Charges Anheuser-Busch InBev with Violating FCPA 
and Whistleblower Protection Laws, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION (Sept. 28, 
2016), https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2016-196.html (last visited Apr. 14, 
2018) (noting that the company was also charged with imposing a financial 
penalty on the whistleblowing employee with a separation agreement that 
included strict non-disclosure terms) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
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December 2014, Avon reached an understanding with the DOJ and 
the SEC for settlement of FCPA charges which included a total of 
$135 million in payments as well as other remedial measures.47 
The Avon charges stemmed from handling of prohibited payments 
in China which were not addressed by the company until the CEO 
received a letter from a whistleblower in China.48 In yet another 
case, in March 2013, the Wall Street Journal reported that the DOJ 
and SEC were investigating a whistleblower complaint of possible 
FCPA violations by Microsoft Corporation in connection with 
business in Italy, Romania and China.49 
FCPA whistleblowers may report suspected violations either 
by contacting the SEC or the DOJ, or through internal company 
processes, which in turn may lead the company to report to 
                                                                                                     
Review). 
 47. See Litigation Release, SEC Charges Avon Products, Inc. with FCPA 
Violations, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION (Dec. 17, 2014), 
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2014/lr23159.htm (last visited Apr. 14, 
2018) (announcing the settlement) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review).  
 48. Id.  
 49. See Christopher Matthews, U.S. Probes Microsoft, Partners on FCPA 
Allegations, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 19, 2013), 
http://blogs.wsj.com/corruption-currents/2013/03/19/u-s-probes-microsoft-
partners-on-fcpa-allegations/?mod=WSJBlog (last visited Jan. 11, 2018) 
(reporting kickback allegations) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). There are many other such complaints. For example, Qualcomm 
Incorporated disclosed in its quarterly filing with the SEC in February 2012 that 
it was under investigation by the SEC and DOJ for FCPA compliance issues 
arising from a whistleblower’s allegations made in December 2009 to the audit 
committee of the Company’s Board of Directors and to the SEC. See Qualcomm 
Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q) (Dec. 25, 2011) (providing consolidated 
financial statements); see also Richard L. Cassin, Qualcomm’s Whistleblower 
Woes, FCPA BLOG (Feb. 2, 2012), 
http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2012/2/2/qualcomms-whistleblower-woes.html 
(last visited Jan. 11, 2018) (providing a brief synopsis of the SEC and DOJ 
investigation initiated in September 2010) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review). 
In October 2012, the Times of India announced that U.S. spirits company Beam 
Inc. was investigating possible FCPA violations in India in response to 
whistleblower complaints. See Boby Kurian, Beam Probes India Unit for Fin 
Lapses, TIMES INDIA (Oct. 22, 2012), http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/ 
business/india-business/Beam-probes-India-unit-for-fin-lapses/articleshow/16762442 
.cms (last visited Jan. 11, 2018) (discussing whistleblower allegations of 
wrongdoing) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
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regulators.50 Studies have shown that whistleblowers generally 
prefer to report potential violations internally, to their 
supervisors.51 As discussed below, outside reporting presents the 
employee with a moral conflict.52 In many cases, internal reports 
lead to internal investigations that result in resolution of the issue 
and/or self-reporting by the company to regulators.53 On the other 
hand, lack of a satisfactory internal response may lead to outside 
reporting.54  
Of course, FCPA investigations may be initiated on grounds 
besides an employee whistleblower’s report.55 Competitors of the 
company making the prohibited payment may be a source of 
information for regulators.56 Alternatively, routine company 
                                                                                                     
 50. The question of internal or external reporting by whistleblowers has 
been a source of controversy surrounding the Dodd–Frank measures.  
 51. See Yuval Feldman & Orly Lobel, Decentralized Enforcement in 
Organizations: An Experimental Approach, 2 REG. & GOVERNANCE 165, 175 (2008) 
(“[T]here are empirical findings that most whistle-blowers turn to external 
channels only after first reporting internally.”); see also Tim Barney, A 
Preliminary Investigation of the Relationship Between Selected Organizational 
Characteristics and External Whistleblowing by Employees, 11 J. BUS. ETHICS 949, 
956 (1992) (detailing the implications of correlations between organization size 
and external whistleblowing); Elletta S. Callahan & Terry M. Dworkin, Who 
Blows the Whistle to the Media, and Why: Organizational Characteristics of Media 
Whistleblowers, 32 AM. BUS. L.J. 151, 170–79 (1994) (positing that internal 
whistleblowers are more likely to report to a media outlet after failing to achieve 
a constructive resolution). See generally ALBERT U. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND 
LOYALTY (1970) (theorizing that when members of an organization perceive 
adverse conditions within the organization, they will either exit the organization 
or voice their grievance). 
 52. See Orly Lobel, Citizenship, Organizational Citizenship and the Laws of 
Overlapping Obligations, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 433, 462 (2009) (“From the individual’s 
perspective, external whistleblowing inherently encompasses moral conflict.”).  
 53. See id. (praising organizational models that prioritize reporting 
sequences). 
 54. See id. at 461 (“[E]xternal reporting is incentivized only when the 
internal reporting channel fails.”). 
 55. See CONVERCENT, THE 7 COMMON CAUSES OF FCPA ENFORCEMENT 4–9 
(2015), http://www.convercent.com/resource/convercent-white-paper-the-common-
causes-of-fcpa-enforcement.pdf (discussing FCPA enforcement and best 
practices).  
 56. See Mark A. Srere & Kristin Robinson, FCPA Investigations: Competitors 
Dropping the Dime, BRYAN CAVE LLP, https://www.bryancave.com/en/thought-
leadership/fcpa-investigations-competitors-dropping-the-dime.html (last visited 
Feb. 6, 2018) (discussing a case where a company that lost a foreign government 
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audits may uncover the prohibited payments.57 Nevertheless, 
company insiders remain a key source of information about 
potential FCPA violations.58 For example, the ongoing 
investigation of possible FCPA violations in Mexico by Wal-Mart 
was triggered by disclosures by one of the company’s real estate 
executives, first internally through the company channels, and 
then, when that did not work, externally, to a reporter from The 
New York Times.59  
FCPA violations such as bribery and accounting irregularities 
are typical types of occupational fraud,60 which in general are 
likely to be detected through whistleblower tips.61 According to an 
Association of Certified Fraud Examiners’ 2016 report, tips are the 
most common method for detecting occupational fraud, accounting 
for 39.1% of cases.62 The percentages are even higher in cases of 
                                                                                                     
contract bid reported a competitor for violating the FCPA) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 57. See FCPA GUIDE, supra note 32, at 53 (stating that “self-reports [and] 
public disclosures by companies” can influence SEC enforcement decisions). 
 58. See id. (stating that “tips from informants or whistleblowers” are a 
primary source of information about corporate wrongdoing). 
 59. See David Barstow, Vast Mexico Bribery Case Hushed Up by Wal-Mart 
After Top-Level Struggle, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 21, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/22/business/at-wal-mart-in-mexico-a-bribe-
inquiry-silenced.html?pagewanted=all (last visited Mar. 5, 2018) (discussing a 
failure of disclosure procedures) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review); Amy Deen Westbrook, Does the Buck Stop Here? Board Responsibility 
for FCPA Compliance, 48 U. TOL. L. REV. 493, 511 (2017) (outlining the efforts of 
Sergio Cicero Zapata to draw Wal-Mart’s attention to the alleged bribery by its 
Mexican subsidiary).  
 60. See ASS’N OF CERTIFIED FRAUD EXAMINERS, 2016 REPORT TO THE NATION 
ON OCCUPATIONAL FRAUD AND ABUSE 11 (2016) (depicting a “Fraud Tree” with the 
different categories of Corruption, Asset Misappropriation, and Financial 
Statement Fraud).  
 61. See Jennifer M. Pacella, Inside or Out? The Dodd–Frank Whistleblower 
Program’s Antiretaliation Protections for Internal Reporting, 86 TEMP. L. REV. 
721, 756 (2014) (positing that whistleblowing is the most effective way to detect 
fraud).  
 62. See ASS’N OF CERTIFIED FRAUD EXAMINERS, supra note 60, at 20 
(discussing the detection of fraud schemes). This percentage is down slightly from 
2014 (42.2%) and 2012 (43.3%). Id. Detection through internal audits and 
management review accounted for only 16.5% and 13.4% of cases, respectively. 
Id. 
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public companies, in which 43.5% of cases of occupational fraud are 
uncovered in response to tips.63  
So far there has been no official confirmation that a Dodd–
Frank whistleblower award has been paid to a person providing 
information on an FCPA violation. When making an award, the 
SEC does not disclose the name of the whistleblower or the 
company involved in order to protect whistleblower anonymity.64 
However, in a majority of FCPA corporate resolutions since the 
passage of Dodd–Frank, the government’s recovery has been 
sufficiently large that a tip that led to the recovery would have 
been eligible for an award under the Dodd–Frank program.65 In 
2017, for example, all eleven of the SEC or DOJ corporate 
resolutions involved fines of $1,000,000 or more.66 As a result, 
notices of all seven of the resolutions in which the SEC (as opposed 
to the DOJ) collected penalties were posted by the SEC’s Office of 
the Whistleblower website as “covered actions” in connection with 
which whistleblowers could apply for awards.67  
In addition, the Financial Review (Australia) reported in 2016 
that the SEC paid a whistleblower bounty of AUS$5 million 
                                                                                                     
 63. See id. at 20, 27 (discussing duration and detection of fraud schemes, 
respectively); see also FREDERICK D. LIPMAN, WHISTLEBLOWERS: INCENTIVES, 
DISINCENTIVES, AND PROTECTION STRATEGIES 2 (2012) (discussing the importance 
of employee tips). 
 64. See U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION OFFICE OF THE WHISTLEBLOWER, 
2017 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 3 (2017), 
https://www.sec.gov/files/sec-2017-annual-report-whistleblower-program.pdf 
(promising to “safeguard whistleblower confidentiality”). 
 65. See id. at 16–17 (reviewing the history of awards given post-Dodd–
Frank). 
 66. See Richard Cassin, The 2016 Enforcement Index, FCPA BLOG, 
http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2017/1/3/the-2016-fcpa-enforcement-index.html 
(last visited Jan. 11, 2018) (relaying FCPA enforcement data from 2016) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 67. Compare Notice of Covered Actions, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, 
https://www.sec.gov/whistleblower/nocas?aId=edit-year&year=All (last visited 
Apr. 14, 2018) (reporting a comprehensive list of actions) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review), with Cassin, supra note 66 (providing a 
condensed synopsis of the cumulative action data from 2017). As discussed below 
in Part III.B.2, the SEC Office of the Whistleblower posts a Notice of Covered 
Action for each SEC action in which monetary sanctions have exceeded 
$1,000,000 and therefore a whistleblower award claim may be filed. See Notice of 
Covered Actions, supra (reporting a comprehensive list of actions).  
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(US$3.75 million) for evidence that exposed alleged bribery by the 
mining company BHP Billiton in connection with its hospitality 
program during the 2008 Beijing Olympics.68 The company had 
resolved an FCPA enforcement action in May 2015, paying the 
SEC $25 million. The SEC posted a Notice of Covered Action with 
respect to the BHP Billiton resolution on June 30, 2015.69 The SEC 
announced an award of “more than $3.5 million” to a whistleblower 
on May 13, 2016.70 Nevertheless, there is no official confirmation 
that the award went to the BHP Billiton employee for an FCPA 
tip. 
2. Robust FCPA Enforcement 
The likelihood of an FCPA tip leading to a Dodd–Frank 
whistleblower award is substantial in the current environment of 
robust FCPA enforcement, even if the award is impossible to 
confirm due to the SEC’s protection of employee anonymity.71 As it 
happened, the Dodd–Frank whistleblower protections and 
incentives were enacted during an historic surge in FCPA 
enforcement.72 With more and more FCPA cases being 
investigated,73 inside tips have come to assume correspondingly 
greater importance.  
                                                                                                     
 68. See McKenzie et al., supra note 18 (providing an Australian perspective 
on recent whistleblower awards). 
 69. See BHP Billiton Ltd. & BHP Billiton Plc, SEC File No. 3-16546 (2015) 
(admin. proc.) (levying sanctions and a hefty fine).  
 70. See Whistleblower Award Proc., SEC File No. 2016-9 (2016) (observing 
that the SEC had originally denied the claim). 
 71. There is a circularity to enforcement of the FCPA in the whistleblower 
incentive context. More enforcement leads to more opportunities for 
whistleblower awards. More awards lead to more whistleblowers coming forward 
with tips. More tips make more enforcement of the FCPA possible.  
 72. See Kevin LaCroix, Corruption Enforcement Actions Surge, Follow-On 
Lawsuits Emerge, D&O DIARY (Apr. 21, 2010), 
https://www.dandodiary.com/2010/04/articles/foreign-corrupt-practices-act/corr
uption-enforcement-actions-surge-follow-on-lawsuits-emerge/ (last visited Jan. 11, 
2018) (“[T]he level of Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) enforcement in the 
first quarter of 2010 was ‘unprecedented.’”) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review). 
 73. See FCPA 2016 Year in Review, JONES DAY (Jan. 2017), 
http://www.jonesday.com/fcpa-2016-year-in-review-01-30-2017/ (last visited on 
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It was not always so. During the first three decades that the 
FCPA was in force, the SEC and DOJ brought a handful of actions 
each year, resolved with moderate fines.74 For example, the DOJ 
and SEC75 brought only five actions in 2004.76 Beginning in 2007, 
enforcement and monetary penalties increased dramatically 77 and 
thirty-eight actions were brought by the SEC and the DOJ.78 
Enforcement has remained strong. 2016 had the largest number of 
FCPA corporate enforcement actions and total settlement amounts 
ever:79 the DOJ brought twenty-one actions and the SEC brought 
                                                                                                     
Jan. 11, 2018) (reporting that as of December 31, 2016, there were an estimated 
eighty active FCPA investigations by the government, and 100 additional 
potential targets) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). In addition, 
in February 2018, an FCPA tracking service reported that 2017 was the most 
active year in history for new FCPA-related investigation, with forty-five new 
FCPA-related investigations publicly disclosed for the first time. See 
FCPATracker, 2017 Was the Most Active Year in History for New FCPA-Related 
Investigations, FCPATRACKER.COM (Feb. 27, 2018), 
https://blog.fcpatracker.com/2018/02/2017-was-the-most-active-year-in-history-
for-new-fcpa-related-investigations/ (listing companies and countries involved in 
investigations disclosed in 2017) (last visited Mar. 24, 2018) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 74. See Mike Koehler, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in the Ultimate 
Year of its Decade of Resurgence, 43 IND. L. REV. 389, 389 (2010) (“FCPA 
enforcement was largely non-existent for most its history.”). 
 75. In some cases, both the SEC and the DOJ initiate actions against the 
same person or entity. 
 76. See Related Enforcement Actions: Chronological List, 2004, U.S. DEP’T 
JUST., https://www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/case/related-enforcement-actions-
chronological-list-2004 (last updated June 16, 2015) (last visited Jan. 11, 2018) 
(listing FCPA actions filed in 2004) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 77. See Westbrook, Enthusiastic Enforcement, supra note 28, at 496. 
 78. See 2007 Year-End FCPA Update, GIBSON DUNN (Jan. 4, 2008), 
http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/pages/2007Year-EndFCPAUpdate.asp
x (last visited Jan. 11, 2018) (providing a thorough synopsis of FCPA enforcement 
in 2007) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 79. See Mike Koehler, The FCPA’s Record-Breaking Year, CONN. L. REV. 
(forthcoming) (discussing the “wide spectrum of enforcement actions”). Although 
2010 may have had higher enforcement action numbers overall, it was skewed as 
a result of the so-called “SHOT Show” arrests of twenty-two individuals (which 
were eventually not pursued). See Steve Johnson, Sting Charges Dismissed, 
Guilty Pleas Vacated, FBI Informant Sentenced to Prison, TFB (Dec. 3, 2012), 
http://www.thefirearmblog.com/blog/2012/12/03/show-show-sting-charges-
dismissed-guilty-pleas-vacated-fbi-informant-sentenced-to-prison/ (last visited 
Jan. 11, 2018) (providing a colorful account of the incident) (on file with the 
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thirty-two.80 2017 was close behind: the DOJ brought twenty-nine 
actions, and the SEC brought ten.81 The 40th anniversary year of 
the FCPA featured extensive enforcement of the once “sleepy” 
law.82  
The fines assessed as part of FCPA settlement agreements 
have also increased dramatically.83 In 2016, for the first time, 
FCPA corporate fines assessed by the DOJ and the SEC topped $2 
billion for the year.84 Calendar year 2016 saw the addition of three 
more “top ten” fines to the FCPA record books: Teva 
Pharmaceuticals settled for $519 million, Och-Ziff settled for $412 
million, and VimpelCom settled for $397.6 million.85 The all-time 
record fine of $965 million, however, was paid by Telia Company 
AB in 2017,86 edging out the $800 million paid by Siemens AG in 
                                                                                                     
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 80. See 2016 Year-End FCPA Update, GIBSON DUNN (Jan. 3, 2017), 
https://www.gibsondunn.com/2016-year-end-fcpa-update/ (last visited Jan. 11, 
2018) (summarizing FCPA enforcement in 2016) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review). 
 81. See 2017 Year-End FCPA Update, GIBSON DUNN 3 (Jan. 2, 2018), 
https://www.gibsondunn.com/2017-year-end-fcpa-update/ (detailing 2017 FCPA 
enforcement). 
 82. See id. at 2 (including statistics illustrating the “meteoric rise” of FCPA 
enforcement in the last four decades). 
 83. Enforcement has not been limited to the biggest companies. The SEC is 
expanding its FCPA enforcement efforts beyond high-value targets to small or 
mid-sized businesses that previously slipped under the radar. For example, in 
2014 the government settled charges against Smith and Wesson Holding 
Corporation that related to a number of small and unsuccessful bribes. See R. 
Daniel O’Connor, Geoff Atkins & Lauren M. Modelski, Smith and Wesson 
Settlement Raises FCPA Concerns for U.S. Businesses, May Establish a New 
Claim for an Insufficient Compliance Program, 12 CORP. L. & ACCOUNTABILITY 
REP. (BNA) 10, 14 (2014) (“Despite the small and unsuccessful nature of the bribes 
authorized, the penalties paid by Smith & Wesson still reached almost $2 
million.”). 
 84. See 2016 Year-End FCPA Update, supra note 80 (announcing that 2016 
was a “precedent-setting year” in which the Department of Justice and Securities 
and Exchange Commission issued “53 combined enforcement actions” and levied 
“more than $2 billion in corporate fines”). 
 85. Id.  
 86. See Press Release, Telecommunications Company Paying $965 for FCPA 
Violations, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION (Sept. 21, 2017), 
https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2017-171 (last visited Apr. 14, 2018) 
(reporting that Swedish company Telia would pay a $965 million global 
settlement with the SEC, DOJ, and Dutch and Swedish law enforcement to 
CASH FOR YOUR CONSCIENCE 1115 
2008.87 Also in 2017, Keppel Offshore & Marine joined the top ten 
list when it agreed to pay $422 million in fines.88 
This surge in enforcement has come along with some 
reorganization at the SEC and the DOJ, which both have 
earmarked personnel for FCPA investigations.89 The staffing 
increase has in turn increased both agencies’ ability to respond to 
tips and other reports of potential FCPA violations.90 It seems 
reasonable to assume that the capacity and impetus to respond to 
whistleblower information has increased accordingly. 
3. Whistleblowers Are Important to FCPA Collateral 
Shareholder Suits 
The “surge in government enforcement of the FCPA has also 
increased opportunities for private plaintiffs to bring collateral 
civil actions.”91 Shareholders routinely file derivative suits or 
securities fraud class actions in the wake of an FCPA 
                                                                                                     
resolve FCPA claims relating to payments in Uzbekistan) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 87. See Richard Cassin, Keppel Offshore Lands Seventh on Our Top Ten 
List, FCPA BLOG, http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2017/12/26/keppel-
offshore-lands-seventh-on-our-top-ten-list.html (last visited Mar. 8, 2018) 
(providing a revised top ten list of the largest FCPA penalties) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 88. See Press Release, Keppel Offshore & Marine Ltd. and U.S. Based 
Subsidiary Agree to Pay $422 Million in Global Penalties to Resolve Foreign 
Bribery Case, U.S. DEP’T JUST. (Dec. 22, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/ 
opa/pr/keppel-offshore-marine-ltd-and-us-based-subsidiary-agree-pay-422-million-
global-penalties (last visited Apr. 14, 2018) (reporting that Keppel entered into a 
deferred prosecution agreement with the DOJ and would pay the penalty to 
resolve charges with U.S., Brazilian, and Singaporean authorities relating to 
Brazilian bribery offenses) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 89. See generally Westbrook, Enthusiastic Enforcement, supra note 28 
(discussing the agencies’ resources and reorganization).  
 90. See id. at 559 (“The growth in the number of federal personnel tasked 
with FCPA enforcement has made increased enforcement not only possible, but 
almost required, by the agencies involved.”); 2017 Year-End FCPA Update, 
GIBSON DUNN, supra note 81, at 5 (cataloguing the credentials of the “dozens of 
dedicated and talented” lawyers enforcing the FCPA at the DOJ and the SEC). 
 91. Amy Deen Westbrook, Double Trouble: Collateral Shareholder Litigation 
Following Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Investigations, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 1217, 
1218 (2012).  
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investigation, often alleging failure of oversight by the board of 
directors92 or misleading disclosure.93 State and federal pleading 
requirements, however, make an internal whistleblower nearly a 
necessity in these suits as well.  
A successful state shareholder derivative suit often requires 
insider information because of obstacles to suit posed by technical 
pleading requirements. To survive a motion to dismiss, 
shareholders filing a derivative suit must either make a pre-suit 
demand on the board of directors, i.e., request that the board sue 
to enforce the company’s rights, or plead with particularity facts 
showing that a pre-suit demand would have been futile and the 
lack of a pre-suit demand should be excused.94 Such a showing is 
exceedingly difficult. For example, in June 2017 the Delaware 
Chancery Court dismissed shareholders’ claims that the 
Qualcomm board disregarded red flags regarding FCPA 
compliance lapses in China and Korea.95 Among the deficiencies 
the court identified in the complaint was the fact that the plaintiffs 
failed to allege the “particularized facts” necessary to show pre-suit 
demand futility.96 
Similarly, the federal Private Securities Litigation Reform Act 
of 199597 imposes additional pleading requirements on securities 
                                                                                                     
92.  These are known as “Caremark Claims” after a seminal director 
oversight/fiduciary duty case decided by the Delaware Chancery Court in 1996. 
See generally In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 
1996) (approving settlement of a derivative action because shareholders were 
unlikely to show that the directors violated their fiduciary duty).   
 93. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2017) (prohibiting manipulative or deceptive 
devices in connection with the purchase or sale of any security). 
 94. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23.1(b)(3) (requiring plaintiffs to “state with 
particularity (A) any effort by the plaintiff to obtain the desired action from the 
directors or comparable authority . . . and (B) the reasons for not obtaining the 
action or not making the effort”). State rules of civil procedure provide the same 
procedural requirement. See generally Rales v. Blasband, 634 A.2d 927, 932 (Del. 
1993); Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 808 (Del. 1984); In re Citigroup Inc. 
S’holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 120 (Del. Ch. 2009).  
 95. See In re Qualcomm Inc. FCPA Stockholder Derivative Litig., C.A. No. 
11152–VCMR, 2017 WL 2608723, at *5 (Del. Ch. June 16, 2017) (granting the 
defendants’ motion to dismiss for failure to make a demand or adequately allege 
demand futility).  
 96. See id. at *3 (discussing the proper response to “red flags” which indicate 
an FCPA violation).  
 97. Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified as amended in various sections 
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law class action lawsuits, requiring plaintiffs to plead claims that 
defendants made false statements with particularity and to create 
a “strong inference” of scienter in those pleadings.98 Failure to 
meet the pleading requirements results in dismissal of the claim.99 
In short, specific information is a requirement of a successful 
shareholder suit, whether the claim is under state or federal law. 
Once a civil suit has commenced, the parties have rights to 
information held by the other side: such information is obtained 
through the discovery process. Pleading, however, begins a case, 
and therefore takes place before the parties have rights to 
discovery. As a result, requirements that a plaintiff “plead with 
particularity”100 are difficult to satisfy without inside information. 
Consequently, in practice, whistleblowers are key not only to 
FCPA investigations, but also to collateral suits filed in the wake 
of such investigations.  
III. The Whistleblower Incentive Program 
A. Whistleblower Law 
1. Background 
The United States has encouraged whistleblowing since its 
inception. On July 30, 1778 the Continental Congress 
unanimously enacted the first whistleblower legislation, which 
read: 
Resolved, That it is the duty of all persons in the service of the 
United States, as well as all other inhabitants thereof, to give 
the earliest information to Congress or any other proper 
authority of any misconduct, frauds or misdemeanors 
                                                                                                     
of 15 U.S.C.). In addition, Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) and Bell 
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555–59 (2007), imposed heightened 
pleading standards.  
 98. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1)–(2) (2012) (setting forth the particularity and 
scienter pleading requirements).  
 99. See id. § 78u-4(b)(3) (mandating dismissal for non-compliant pleadings). 
 100. See FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b) (requiring particularity when pleading fraud or 
mistake). 
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committed by any officers or persons in the service of these 
states, which may come to their knowledge.101  
U.S. whistleblower law, however, has been fairly described as more 
of a patchwork than a coherent legal regime.102 Some current laws 
date back over a century. For example, the False Claims Act 
(FCA)103 was first passed in 1863 to provide protection and 
incentives to persons who report fraud against the government.104 
Strengthened in 1986, the FCA includes both substantial 
anti-retaliation protections for the persons who report fraud and 
qui tam provisions that permit private parties to file suit in place 
of the government.105 Because its qui tam provisions permit the 
recovery of a bounty, the FCA will be discussed in more detail 
below in Part V.B.  
The majority of whistleblower provisions focus on protecting 
employees from various forms of employer retaliation, most 
notably discharge.106 Such anti-retaliation protection is important: 
reporting legal violations risks the whistleblower’s job and career. 
Some studies show that a majority of employee whistleblowers are 
demoted or fired for blowing the whistle.107  
                                                                                                     
 101. Legislation of July 30, 1778, reprinted in JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL 
CONGRESS, 1774–1789 (Worthington C. Ford et al. eds.) (Washington, D.C., 1904–
37) 11:732. 
 102. See Joel D. Hesch, Whistleblower Rights and Protections: Critiquing 
Federal Whistleblower Laws and Recommending Filling in Missing Pieces to Form 
a Beautiful Patchwork Quilt, 6 LIBERTY U. L. REV. 51, 54 (2011) (advocating for 
the retention of a myriad of different protections); Boyne, supra note 42, at 279, 
280 (calling U.S. whistleblower protections “an inconsistent legislative 
patchwork”). 
 103. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–3733.  
 104. See Act of Mar. 2, 1863, ch. 67, 12 Stat. 696 (1863) (codified as amended 
in 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–3733); see also Jeanne A. Markey & Gary L. Azorsky, 
Companies and Counsel Beware: Companies Cannot Override Employees’ Right 
to Act as Whistle-Blowers Under False Claims Act, 12 CORP. L. & ACCOUNTABILITY 
REP. (BNA) 786, 786 (2014) [hereinafter Markey & Azorsky] (discussing the 
history of whistleblowing).  
 105. See 31 U.S.C §§ 3730–3732 (2012) (outlining, among other things, the 
rights of parties to qui tam actions). 
 106. See generally Sinzdak, supra note 38 (providing a comparative analysis 
of current whistleblower laws). 
 107. See Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, Mutiny by the Bounties? An Attempt to 
Reform Wall Street by the New Whistleblower Provisions of the Dodd–Frank Act, 
2012 B.Y.U. L. REV. 73, 113 (noting that most whistleblowers are fired).  
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Whistleblower anti-retaliation protections have thus 
developed as exceptions to employment “at will” since the 1930s, 
with an increase in laws protecting employees against discharge 
appearing since the 1960s.108 Over thirty federal whistleblower 
statutes have been passed in the last several decades.109 In 1978, 
the United States passed the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978,110 
the first federal statutory cause of action protecting whistleblowers 
from retaliation.111 The Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989,112 
enacted in 1989, strengthened protection for federal employees by 
preventing unlawful retaliation and outlawing adverse 
employment actions against employees who report prohibited 
practices to the proper authorities.113 There are also more specific 
laws protecting whistleblowers who report particular types of 
violations, such as discrimination,114 environmental issues,115 and 
conduct adverse to health, safety and welfare. 
                                                                                                     
 108. See Lobel, supra note 52, at 441 (discussing the National Labor Relations 
Act, the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Fair Labor Standards Act, the Civil Service 
Reform Act, the Occupational Safety and Health Act, and the Polygraph 
Protection Act of 1988).  
 109. See Federal Whistleblower Protections, NAT’L WHISTLEBLOWER CTR. 
(2017), https://www.whistle 
blowers.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=816&Itemid=129 
(last visited Jan. 11, 2018) (providing a comprehensive list of whistleblower laws) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). In addition, there is often a 
public policy exception to state employment-at-will doctrine which provides a 
remedy for discharging an employee for reporting a violation of law. Such a claim 
might be either a tort or contract violation, with higher damages possible in tort 
jurisdictions. 
 110. Pub. L. No. 95-454, 92 Stat. 1111 (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 5 U.S.C.). 
 111. S. REP. No. 100-413, at 2 (1988).  
 112. Pub. L. No. 101-12, 103 Stat. 16 (codified in sections of 5 U.S.C.).  
 113. See Hesch, supra note 102, at 63 (referring to the Whistleblower 
Protection Act as a “ground-breaking law”). 
 114. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1991), the 
Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2009), the Age Discrimination 
in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621 (1967), and the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. 
§ 206(d) (2016), protect employees (and applicants for employment) from 
retaliation for reporting discrimination.  
 115. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7622 (2012) (protecting whistleblowers under the 
Clean Air Act); 33 U.S.C. § 1367 (protecting whistleblowers under the Clean 
Water Act). 
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The protections and incentives for whistleblowers who report 
securities laws violations have been the focus of legislation since 
2000, with the Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX) in 2002116 and Dodd–
Frank in 2010.117  
2. Securities Law and the Sarbanes–Oxley Act 
The whistleblower landscape was significantly altered in 2002 
with the passage of SOX. Enacted after the Enron and WorldCom 
scandals in order to protect shareholders and the public against 
fraudulent financial reporting and accounting practices, SOX 
increased reporting obligations for issuers,118 thereby increasing 
the amount of information required and available for inspection. 
SOX resulted in revamped and reenergized compliance programs 
at many issuers. In an effort to encourage and increase internal 
reporting of violations of U.S. securities laws, SOX § 806 also 
added substantial protections for whistleblowers, including both 
federal employees and, for the first time, employees of publicly 
traded companies.119 In fact, in an apparent reference to the efforts 
of Sherron Watkins at Enron, the Senate report that was produced 
in connection with SOX stated that “in a variety of instances when 
corporate employees at Enron and [Arthur] Andersen attempted to 
report or ‘blow the whistle’ on fraud . . . they were discouraged at 
nearly every turn.”120 
SOX protects employees who provide information or assist in 
an investigation regarding any conduct that the employee 
reasonably believes constitutes a violation of several laws 
                                                                                                     
 116. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A.  
 117. 12 U.S.C. § 5511.  
 118. So much so, in fact, that implementation of several of the audit 
provisions had to be postponed, and some foreign private issuers delisted from 
U.S. exchanges to avoid what they saw as expensive and burdensome regulation. 
SOX also imposes an obligation on attorneys to report “up the ladder,” 15 U.S.C. 
§ 7245, or in some cases to a qualified legal compliance committee, 17 C.F.R. §§ 
205.2(k), 205(c) (2018).  
 119. See Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 806, 116 Stat. 
745 (outlining the “whistleblower protection for employees of publicly traded 
companies”). See generally 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (2012). 
 120. S. REP. No. 107-146, at 4–5 (2002). 
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prohibiting fraud, or of any rule or regulation of the SEC.121 The 
SOX anti-retaliation provisions were included to prevent 
employers from discouraging employees with knowledge of 
improper financial reporting and accounting practices from 
reporting.122  
B. Dodd–Frank 
1. Dodd–Frank Section 922 
Less than a decade after the passage of SOX, and despite the 
reporting and assessment mechanisms it imposed on public 
companies, Congress again found itself grappling with corporate 
improprieties. Dodd–Frank was passed following the Global 
Financial Crisis and the discovery in 2008 of Bernard Madoff’s 
multibillion-dollar Ponzi scheme, along with information that 
financial analyst and certified fraud examiner Harry Markopolos 
had been attempting to report Madoff’s fraud to the SEC for many 
years.123 With Dodd–Frank, Congress again sought to curb 
                                                                                                     
 121. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a)(1). This includes “frauds and swindles,” id. § 1341, 
“fraud by wire, radio, or television,” id. § 1343, “bank fraud,” id. § 1344, “securities 
and commodities fraud,” id. § 1348, and any provision of federal law relating to 
fraud against shareholders. Id. § 1514A(a)(1). SOX prevents an employer from 
discharging or retaliating against an employee for engaging in a protected 
activity. The SOX whistleblower protections only apply when the information is 
provided to, or investigation conducted by, a federal regulatory or law 
enforcement agency, a member of Congress or a committee of Congress, or a 
person with supervisory authority over the employee. Id. There is also protection 
for testifying. Id. § 1514A(a)(2). 
 122. See DAVISPOLK, RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN WHISTLEBLOWER 
PROTECTIONS: LEGAL ANALYSIS AND PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS 2 (2014), 
https://www.davispolk.com/files/06.09.14.Recent.Developments.in_.Whistleblowe
r.Protections.pdf (discussing SOX). Like most other whistleblower protection 
laws, SOX requires whistleblower anti-retaliation claims to be filed with the 
Department of Labor (DOL). Id. SOX, however, added a mechanism to file a 
complaint in federal district court if the DOL process does not reach a final 
resolution of the complaint within 180 days. Sarbanes–Oxley § 806(a), 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1514A(b)(1)(B). Nevertheless, the process may take years. 
 123. See HARRY MARKOPOLOS, NO ONE WOULD LISTEN: A TRUE FINANCIAL 
THRILLER 1 (2010). In his testimony before Congress, Markopolos revealed that 
he had attempted to tell the SEC about the Madoff investment fraud in 2000, 
2001, and 2005. He also sent information about the fraud to the Wall Street 
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fraudulent activity at the country’s largest financial companies, 
and to implement measures to prohibit and punish corrupt or 
irresponsible behavior at the institutions in which U.S. citizens 
invest their savings. Protecting and incentivizing whistleblowers 
was an integral part of that effort.  
Among the tools assembled in the Dodd–Frank statute were 
specific new rules regarding the protection and treatment of 
persons who report violations of U.S. federal securities laws to 
regulatory authorities. Dodd–Frank § 922 added new Section 21F 
to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, “Securities Whistleblower 
Incentives and Protection,”124 which in many ways superseded the 
SOX whistleblower provision by strengthening its protections and 
adding incentives.  
Section 922 defines a whistleblower as: 
[A]ny individual who provides, or 2 or more individuals acting 
jointly who provide, information relating to a violation of the 
securities laws to the Commission, in a manner established, by 
rule or regulation, by the Commission.125 
A whistleblower who voluntarily provides original information to 
the SEC that leads to the successful enforcement by the SEC of a 
federal court or administrative action in which the SEC obtains 
monetary sanctions totaling more than $1,000,000126 may receive 
an award equal to between 10% and 30% of the monetary sanctions 
collected by the SEC.127 Original information includes information 
that is (i) derived from the independent knowledge or analysis of 
the whistleblower; (ii) not known to the SEC from any other 
source; and (iii) not exclusively derived from an allegation made in 
a judicial or administrative hearing, a governmental report, 
hearing, audit or investigation, or from the news media.128 Dodd–
Frank also required the U.S. Department of the Treasury to 
                                                                                                     
Journal and former New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer.  
 124. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6 (2012). 
 125. Id. § 78u-6(a)(6). 
 126. The SEC rules permit aggregation of multiple SEC cases that arise out 
of a common nucleus of operative facts. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-4(d) (2018).  
 127. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(b). 
 128. Id. § 78u-6(a)(3). 
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establish the Securities and Exchange Commission Investor 
Protection Fund to be used to pay whistleblower awards.129  
As explained by the SEC, the Dodd–Frank bounty system was 
created to encourage individuals with knowledge of violations of 
the U.S. securities laws to provide that information voluntarily to 
the SEC.130 The bounty thus helps to “correct the imbalance 
between the potential whistleblower’s ethical desire to report fraud 
and the economic disadvantages of doing so, such as legal costs and 
loss of employment, by offering financial rewards to offset the 
whistleblower’s career risk.”131 
Dodd–Frank required “Implementation and Transition 
Provisions for Whistleblower Protection,”132 and directed the SEC 
to issue final regulations within nine months to flesh out the 
statutory provisions. The SEC was also directed to establish a 
separate office within the agency to administer and enforce the 
provisions of the Dodd–Frank whistleblower incentives and 
protections.133 This office is the Office of the Whistleblower.  
2. The 2011 SEC Regulations Implementing the 
Incentive Program 
The process of drafting the regulations implementing the new 
whistleblower incentive provisions took almost a year and involved 
an extensive public notice and comment process. The SEC issued 
proposed Regulation 21F on November 3, 2010, which defined 
critical terms, outlined the procedures for applying for 
whistleblower awards, and generally explained the scope of the 
                                                                                                     
 129. Id. § 78u-6(g)(1)–(2). The Investor Protection Fund is also used for the 
Inspector General of the SEC. The money comes from fines the SEC receives 
which are not used to pay restitution to victims, and by investments made by the 
fund. Id. § 78u-6(g)(3). 
 130. See Whistleblower Award Proc., SEC File No. 34-73174 (2014).  
 131. See Jennifer M. Pacella, Inside or Out? The Dodd–Frank Whistleblower 
Program’s Anti-Retaliation Protections for Internal Reporting, 86 TEMP. L. REV. 
721, 727 (2014) (providing an overview of Dodd–Frank). 
 132. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-7(2012).  
 133. Id. § 78u-6. 
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whistleblower program.134 In response, the SEC received more 
than 240 comment letters and approximately 1,300 form letters.135  
By far, the most controversial provisions related to the 
relationship between the Dodd–Frank whistleblower program, 
including its incentives, and internal compliance programs at 
affected companies.136 Dodd–Frank § 922 clearly requires a 
whistleblower to report a violation to the SEC in order to qualify 
for an incentive award, i.e., a whistleblower who only reports the 
violation internally is not eligible for a bounty.137 However, the 
statute did not address what role a whistleblower’s internal 
reporting would play in the award decision. Many of the letters 
addressed the impact of the Dodd–Frank requirements on FCPA 
compliance and enforcement directly. For example, 
representatives of eleven large U.S. companies wrote to argue that, 
given the substantial expertise and well developed compliance 
programs at many companies, the SEC regulations should 
encourage whistleblowers to use internal company reporting 
procedures first.138 Some argued that the whistleblower program 
would strengthen FCPA enforcement by encouraging individuals 
                                                                                                     
 134. See Implementation of the Whistleblower Provisions of Section 21F of 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Exchange Act Release No.. 34-64545, 17 
C.F.R. 240.21f-1–240.21f-17 and 17 CFR 249.1–249.2000 (effective date Aug. 12, 
2011) (reconciling whistleblower requirements with the administrative structure 
of the SEC).  
 135.  The public comments received by the SEC are available at 
https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-33-10/s73310.shtml.  
 136. Implementation of the Whistleblower Provisions of Section 21F of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Exchange Act Release No.. 34-64545, 17 C.F.R. 
240.21f-1–240.21f-17 and 17 CFR 249.1–249.2000, at “Background and 
Summary,” 4. (effective date August 12, 2011). Other hot button issues in the 
rulemaking process related to who should be eligible for awards (i.e., should a 
culpable individual be able to claim an award?) and the procedures for submitting 
information and making a claim for an award. Id. 
 137. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(b)(1) (2012) (prescribing the payment of awards to 
“whistleblowers who voluntarily provided original information to the 
Commission”). 
 138. Letter from Donna Dabney, Vice President, Sec’y & Corp. Governance 
Counsel, Alcoa Inc. et al., to Ms. Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. 
Comm’n (Dec. 17, 2010) (on file with author); see also Letter from Steven A. 
Tyrrell, to Ms. Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, (Dec. 17, 
2010) (on file with author). 
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to report.139 Others argued the opposite.140 Still others expressed 
concern about the need to protect foreign whistleblowers, 
especially in the FCPA context.141 
The final regulations, “Securities Whistleblower Incentives 
and Protections,”142 were approved on May 25, 2011 and took effect 
on August 12, 2011 (2011 Regulations). The mechanics of the 
whistleblowing process are fairly straightforward. The SEC Office 
of the Whistleblower set up a website for individuals seeking to 
disclose potential violations, complete with a standardized tip form 
(Form TCR: Tip, Complaint or Referral) for whistleblowers to fill 
out.143 There is also a whistleblower hotline to respond to questions 
from the public about the program.144 The website posts the Notice 
of Covered Actions taken by the SEC (i.e., SEC enforcement 
actions that result in fines of at least $1,000,000, making them 
actions with respect to which, if a whistleblower’s tip led to the 
successful enforcement, an award may be pursued by that 
whistleblower).145 Under the rules, individuals who satisfy the 
Dodd–Frank whistleblower requirements have ninety calendar 
days after the notice is posted on the SEC website to apply for an 
award by submitting a Form WB-AOO to the Office of the 
Whistleblower.146 Between the start of the Dodd–Frank program 
                                                                                                     
 139. Letter from James S. Lessard-Templin, Customs & Int’l Trade Attorney, 
to Ms. Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Dec. 20, 2010) (on 
file with author).  
 140. See generally Dave Ebersole, Blowing the Whistle on Dodd–Frank 
Whistleblower Reform, 6 OHIO ST. ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 123 (2011) 
(submitted as a comment to the SEC) (advocating for a progressive approach to 
whistleblower reform). 
 141. Letter from Stephen M. Kohn, Exec. Dir., Nat’l Whistleblowers Ctr., to 
Ms. Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Feb. 15, 2011) (on 
file with author). 
 142. 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.21F-1–240-21F-17 (2017). 
 143. Office of the Whistleblower: Submit a Tip¸ U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE 
COMMISSION, https://www.sec.gov/whistleblower/submit-a-tip (last visited Jan. 
25, 2018) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 144. See id. (“Phone: (202) 551-4790.”). 
 145. Office of the Whistleblower: Previous News and Releases, U.S. SEC. & 
EXCHANGE COMMISSION, https://www.sec.gov/whistleblower/pressreleases (last 
visited Jan. 25, 2018) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 146. See Notice of Covered Actions, supra note 67 (providing a comprehensive 
list of actions). 
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and the end of fiscal year 2017, the SEC posted a total of 1,080 
Notice of Covered Actions, of which 193 were in 2017.147  
With respect to the controversial issue of internal reporting in 
the award context, the SEC decided not to require that 
whistleblowers also report violations internally to be eligible for an 
award.148 The 2011 Regulations simply defined whistleblowers as: 
(a) Definition of a whistleblower. 
(1) You are a whistleblower if, alone or jointly with others, you 
provide the Commission with information pursuant to 
the [Procedures for submitting original information] of this 
chapter, and the information relates to a possible violation of 
the Federal securities laws (including any rules or regulations 
thereunder) that has occurred, is ongoing, or is about to occur. 
A whistleblower must be an individual. A company or another 
entity is not eligible to be a whistleblower.149 
Instead of requiring internal reporting for award eligibility, the 
2011 Regulations incentivized whistleblowers to use their 
companies’ internal compliance and reporting systems when 
appropriate.150 The rules provide that a whistleblower can receive 
an award for reporting original information to a company’s 
internal compliance and reporting systems if the company 
self-reports to the SEC and that report leads to a successful 
enforcement action.151 In fact, the employee is considered a 
whistleblower under the Dodd–Frank program as of the date the 
employee reports the information internally as long as the 
employee provides the same information to the SEC within 120 
days.152 In addition, if the whistleblower first reports internally 
                                                                                                     
 147. See SEC, 2017 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 16, at 14 (reporting 193 
notices); see also U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, 2016 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 
ON THE DODD–FRANK WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM 14 (2016) (reporting 178 notices); 
U.S. SEC. & EXCH. & EXCH. COMM’N, 2015 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE 
DODD–FRANK WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM 12 (2015) (reporting 709 notices since the 
program’s inception). 
 148. See 17 C.F.R. § 21F-2(a) (2017) (“Whistleblower status and retaliation 
protection.”). 
 149. Id.  
 150. Id. § 240.21F-4(b)(7). 
 151. See id. (describing appropriate procedures post-disclosure). 
 152. Id.  
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and then the entity reports to the SEC, “all of the information that 
the entity provides to the SEC will be attributed to the 
whistleblower.”153 When determining the amount of an award to a 
whistleblower, if the whistleblower voluntarily participated in his 
or her company’s internal compliance and reporting system, then 
the amount of the award may be increased.154 Conversely, a 
whistleblower’s interference with internal compliance and 
reporting is a factor that may decrease the amount of an award.155  
Accordingly, the Dodd–Frank whistleblower incentive 
program has paid several awards to whistleblowers identified as 
having tried first to report their concerns through internal 
channels. In August 2014, the SEC announced an award of 
$300,000 to a company employee who performed audit and 
compliance functions.156 The employee initially reported the 
violations internally, but when the company failed to take action, 
the employee reported to the SEC.157 Similarly, in July 2014, the 
SEC announced an award of more than $400,000 to a 
whistleblower who reported a fraud to the SEC after the company 
failed to address the employee’s concerns internally.158  
                                                                                                     
 153. Pacella, supra note 131, at 758. 
 154. See id. (“To incentivize employees to blow the whistle internally and to 
use their companies’ internal compliance and reporting systems, the SEC has 
included as criteria for increasing an award whether a whistleblower voluntarily 
participated in an entity’s internal compliance program.”). 
 155. Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections, 76 Fed. Reg. 
34,300, 34,301 (June 13, 2011) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240 & 249). 
 156. See Press Release, SEC Announces $300,000 Whistleblower Award to 
Audit and Compliance Professional Who Reported Company’s Wrongdoing, U.S. 
SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION (Aug. 29, 2014), https://www.sec.gov/news/press-
release/2014-180 (last visited Apr. 14, 2018) (“Whistleblower Came to SEC After 
Reporting Internally and Company Failed to Take Action.”) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 157. Id. 
 158. See Press Release, SEC Announces Award for Whistleblower Who 
Reported Fraud to SEC After Company Failed to Address Issue Internally, U.S. 
SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION (July 31, 2014), https://www.sec.gov/news/press-
release/2014-154 (last visited Apr. 14, 2018) (“The whistleblower did everything 
feasible to correct the issue internally. When it became apparent that the 
company would not address the issue, the whistleblower came to the SEC in a 
final effort to correct the fraud and prevent investors from being harmed.”) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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3. Internal Reporting and Anti-Retaliation: The 2015 SEC 
Interpretive Guidance 
The 2011 Regulations addressed which whistleblowers 
qualified for the Dodd–Frank incentive awards and 
anti-retaliation protections. However, the scope of the 
anti-retaliation provisions—in particular, whether they protect 
whistleblowers who report internally but not to the SEC—was the 
subject of controversy for several years.  
Section 922 prohibits an employer from discharging or 
retaliating against an employee for:  
(i) . . . providing information to the Commission in accordance 
with this section; 
(ii) . . . initiating, testifying in, or assisting in any investigation 
or judicial or administrative action of the Commission based 
upon or related to such information; or 
(iii) . . . making disclosures that are required or protected 
under the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002, the Securities Exchange 
Act, and any other law, rule, or regulation subject to the 
jurisdiction of the Commission.159 
The 2011 Regulations set out a definition of whistleblower “for 
the purposes of the anti-retaliation provisions” of Dodd–Frank as 
follows: 
(b) [. . .] you are a whistleblower if: 
(i) You possess a reasonable belief that the information you are 
providing relates to a possible securities law violation (or, where 
applicable, to a possible violation of the provisions [relating to 
temporary restraining orders relating to victim or witness 
                                                                                                     
 159. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A) (2012). Also included among the disclosures 
that are protected are those in connection with 18 U.S.C. § 1513, which deals with 
criminal punishment for attempts to kill witnesses, informants or victims. See 18 
U.S.C. § 1513 (providing the rules regarding “[r]etaliating against a witness, 
victim, or an informant”). An individual alleging discharge or discrimination 
under the Dodd–Frank provisions may bring an action directly in a U.S. district 
court for relief. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(B) (directing that actions be brought 
in the “appropriate district court of the United States”). The Dodd–Frank 
whistleblower provisions also include a longer statute of limitations for actions 
and greater damages than were provided in SOX. See id. § 78u-6(h)(1)(B)–(C) 
(detailing the rules for the statute of limitations and damages awards). 
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harassment]) that has occurred, is ongoing, or is about to occur, 
and; 
(ii) You provide that information in a manner described in [the 
general provisions relating to the protection of whistleblowers 
against retaliation set out in Section 922 of Dodd–Frank]. 
(iii) The anti-retaliation protections apply whether or not you 
satisfy the requirements, procedures and conditions to qualify 
for an award.160 
Different courts interpreted the breadth of the anti-retaliation 
provisions differently. In 2013, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Fifth Circuit held in Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA), L.L.C.161 that 
Dodd–Frank’s anti-retaliation provisions apply only to employees 
reporting information to the SEC, and do not extend to an 
employee who reported an FCPA violation only through internal 
channels.162 The SEC took the opposite position, arguing in amicus 
curiae briefs in private retaliation lawsuits that individuals are 
entitled to protection from employment retaliation if they report 
information about a possible securities violation internally at a 
publicly traded company, regardless of whether they separately 
report the information to the SEC.163 
Confronted with the issue in 2014 in Liu Meng-Lin v. Siemens 
AG,164 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit sidestepped 
the internal reporting issue and instead affirmed a trial court’s 
dismissal of a claim of retaliation for reporting an FCPA violation 
                                                                                                     
 160. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-2(b) (2017).  
 161. Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA), L.L.C., 720 F.3d 620 (5th Cir. 2013).  
 162. See id. at 623 (holding that “the plain language of the Dodd–Frank 
whistleblower-protection provision creates a private cause of action only for 
individuals who provide information relating to a violation of the securities laws 
to the SEC”).  
 163. See SEC, 2017 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 16, at 22 (referring to the 
amicus curiae brief filed by the U.S. Solicitor General, acting on behalf of the DOJ 
and the SEC, which urged “the Supreme Court to recognize that Dodd–Frank’s 
statutory language, its legislative history, and the Commission’s rules require 
that individuals who internally report potential securities violations at a 
publicly-traded company are entitled to employment retaliation protection, 
regardless of whether they have separately reported that information to the 
Commission”). 
 164. 763 F.3d 175 (2d Cir. 2014).  
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on extraterritoriality grounds.165 The next year, in Berman v. 
Neo@Ogilvy LLC,166 the Second Circuit again confronted the 
definitional issue, this time finding that the anti-retaliation 
provisions did protect an employee who, as required by his job, 
reported internally first.167 The employee in Berman only reported 
to the SEC after he was fired from his job.168 
That same year, the SEC issued an “Interpretation of the 
SEC’s Whistleblower Rules under Section 21F of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934” (2015 Interpretive Guidance) in order to 
settle the ambiguity.169 The 2015 Interpretive Guidance stated 
that an individual’s status as a whistleblower for purposes of 
protection under the Dodd–Frank anti-retaliation provisions does 
not require submission of the information to the SEC; instead, 
internal reporting is sufficient.170  
Nonetheless, as discussed above, a circuit split developed. On 
the one hand, there was the argument that in order to qualify as a 
whistleblower for any Dodd–Frank purposes, including both 
incentive awards and anti-retaliation protection, an employee 
must report to the SEC.171 On the other hand, there was the 
argument, espoused by the SEC, that that definition including the 
SEC reporting requirement applies only to the incentive award 
program.172 In the anti-retaliation context, employees may also 
                                                                                                     
 165. See id. at 178 (deciding to “affirm on the ground that Liu seeks an 
extraterritorial application of the antiretaliation provision, and that that 
provision does not apply extraterritorially”). 
 166. 801 F.3d 145 (2d Cir. 2015).  
 167. See id. at 151 (interpreting the anti-retaliation provisions).  
 168. See id. at 149 (noting that the employee did not report to the SEC until 
after he was fired, and then sought an anti-retaliation remedy under Dodd–
Frank).  
 169. See Interpretation of the SEC’s Whistleblower Rules under Section 21F 
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 80 Fed. Reg. 47,829 (Aug. 10, 2015) (to be 
codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 241). 
 170. See id. /(interpreting the anti-retaliation provisions). The SEC explained 
that anti-retaliation protection does not “depend on adherence to the reporting 
procedures specified in Exchange Act Rule 21F-9(a) [Procedures for submitting 
original information to the SEC], but is determined solely by the terms of 
Exchange Act Rule 21F-2(b)(1) [Prohibition against Retaliation].” Id. 
 171. See supra notes 161–163 and accompanying text (giving the Fifth 
Circuit’s view).  
 172. See supra notes 166–170 and accompanying text (encapsulating the view 
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qualify as whistleblowers if they “mak[e] disclosures that are 
required or protected under”173 SOX—and SOX explicitly protects 
internal as well as external reporters.174 
In June 2017, the Supreme Court of the United States granted 
certiorari in Digital Realty Trust Inc. v. Somers.175 In that case, the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit had sided with the 
Second Circuit, affirming the lower court’s decision that the Dodd–
Frank whistleblower anti-retaliation provisions extend to all 
persons who make disclosures of suspected violations, regardless 
of whether they disclose only internally or to the SEC.176 The 
Supreme Court issued its decision on February 21, 2018, reversing 
the Ninth Circuit decision and, at the same time, abrogating 
Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy LLC. The Supreme Court opted for the 
narrower approach: the Dodd–Frank anti-retaliation provisions, 
like its bounty provisions, require whistleblowers to report 
externally, to the SEC, in order to benefit from the statute’s 
protections.177  
C. Issues Related to Dodd–Frank Whistleblowers in the FCPA 
Context 
Although the circuit split regarding the definition of 
whistleblowers has been resolved, there remain several open 
                                                                                                     
of the Second Circuit and the SEC).  
 173. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A)(iii) (2012). 
 174. See Sinzdak, supra note 38, at 1633 n.5 (“SOX protects both employees 
who report internally to supervisors and externally to government regulators.”).  
 175. Dig. Realty Tr., Inc. v. Somers, 137 S. Ct. 2300 (2017). Despite the 
Supreme Court’s grant of certiorari, lower courts continued to make decisions on 
one side of the split or the other. See, e.g., Smith v. Raytheon Co., 
No. 1:17-CV-00438, slip op. at 1 (E.D. Va. Aug. 11, 2017) (siding with the Fifth 
Circuit by adopting a narrow definition of a whistleblower). 
 176. See Somers v. Dig. Realty Tr., Inc., 850 F.3d 1045, 1050–51 (9th Cir. 
2017) (concluding that Somers was a whistleblower under Dodd–Frank, although 
he made his reports to the company’s senior management and not to the SEC).  
 177. See Dig. Realty Tr., Inc. v. Somers, 138 S. Ct. 767 (2018) (holding that 
whistleblowers must report to the SEC in order to fall within the Dodd–Frank 
definition of whistleblower for purposes of the anti-retaliation protections as well 
as the incentive program). 
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issues of interpretation with respect to the application of the 
Dodd–Frank whistleblower provisions in the FCPA context.  
1. Domestic Concerns or Just Issuers? 
In a 2012 case, the U.S. District Court in the Middle District 
of Tennessee addressed the ramifications of the shared FCPA 
jurisdiction of the DOJ and SEC,178 albeit in the context of the 
Dodd–Frank anti-retaliation provisions.179 In Nollner v. Southern 
Baptist Convention, Inc.,180 the court found that because the 
employee reported alleged violations of the FCPA anti-bribery 
provisions by a domestic concern, not by an issuer, the employee 
did not qualify as a whistleblower for purposes of Dodd–Frank’s 
anti-retaliation provisions.181 As discussed above in Part III.B, the 
anti-retaliation provisions protect whistleblowers who provide 
information to the SEC; who assist in an investigation or action of 
the SEC related to such information; or who make disclosures that 
are required or protected under SOX, the Securities Exchange Act 
of 1934, or any other law, rule or regulation subject to the SEC’s 
jurisdiction.182 
The issue in Nollner thus centered on whether the disclosure 
was “required or protected” by laws within the SEC’s 
jurisdiction.183 The court explained that, while the SEC exercises 
jurisdiction over civil enforcement of FCPA anti-bribery provisions 
violations by issuers, Nollner’s case involved an alleged violation 
                                                                                                     
 178. For an excellent analysis of the DOJ and SEC’s FCPA enforcement 
jurisdiction, see Black, supra note 20, at 1095 (arguing that FCPA enforcement 
does not fit within the SEC’s mission).  
 179. Nollner v. S. Baptist Convention, Inc., 852 F. Supp. 2d 986 (M.D. Tenn. 
2015). 
 180. 852 F. Supp. 2d 986 (M.D. Tenn. 2015). 
 181. See id. at 997 (finding that “because the defendants are not ‘issuers’ for 
purposes of the FCPA, they are not ‘subject to the jurisdiction’ of the SEC with 
respect to FCPA violations”). 
 182. See supra Part III.B (explaining the applicable protections for 
whistleblowers). 
 183. Nollner, 852 F. Supp. 2d at 995 (asserting that “a plaintiff seeking 
protection . . . must at least show . . . the disclosure was ‘required or protected’ by 
that law, rule, or regulation within the SEC’s jurisdiction”). 
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of the FCPA anti-bribery provisions by a non-issuer domestic 
concern, an area under the enforcement authority of the DOJ.184 
Because of that distinction, as a non-issuer, Nollner’s employer 
was not subject to the jurisdiction of the SEC, and Nollner did not 
qualify for Dodd–Frank anti-retaliation protection.185 
Although not a case that dealt with an incentive award, 
Nollner is a Dodd–Frank whistleblower case.186 In Nollner, the 
court strictly distinguished between the application of the FCPA 
to issuers and the application of the FCPA to domestic concerns in 
the Dodd–Frank whistleblowing context.187 If a question arises 
about whether courts will apply the Dodd–Frank whistleblower 
provisions to all FCPA violations, as opposed to just those by 
issuers, Nollner seems to indicate that they will not.188  
2. Audit and Compliance Personnel and Attorneys 
Another issue that has arisen in the Dodd–Frank 
whistleblower context is whether employees who perform audit, 
compliance or legal functions for a company can be eligible for 
incentive awards. With respect to compliance professionals, the 
answer appears to be “yes.”189 In August 2014, the SEC awarded 
                                                                                                     
 184. See id. at 996 (“Here, because the defendants are not issuers, only the 
DOJ—not the SEC—has jurisdiction over them with respect to FCPA 
violations.”).  
 185. See id. at 997 (“Thus, even assuming the allegations to be true, the 
Nollners may not maintain DFA [Dodd–Frank Act] retaliation claims premised 
on their reporting of potential FCPA violations by the defendants.”).  
 186. See id. at 992–98 (detailing the “Dodd–Frank Act Claim”).  
 187. See id. at 996 (“Thus, the jurisdiction of the SEC with respect to the 
FCPA violations is limited only to civil actions to enforce violations by issuers, but 
does not encompass FCPA violations by domestic concerns, which are subject to 
exclusive DOJ enforcement (civil and/or criminal).”).  
 188. See id. at 1002 (dismissing with prejudice the plaintiffs’ Dodd–Frank 
claims).  
 189. Note, however, that the answer appears to be different in the 
anti-retaliation context. In Reyher v. Grant Thornton, LLP, the U.S. District 
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania dismissed an anti-retaliation suit 
by a certified public accountant who allegedly was fired for reporting accounting 
irregularities in certain clients’ tax documents. No. 16–1757, 2017 WL 2880585, 
at *1 (E.D. Pa. July 6, 2017). The court dismissed the suit, reasoning that, because 
the whistleblower worked for a private company and failed to allege that public 
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$300,000 to an audit and compliance employee who reported to the 
SEC after the company did not act on the information the employee 
provided.190 Sean McKessy, then-Chief of the SEC’s Office of the 
Whistleblower, said that “[i]ndividuals who perform internal 
audit, compliance, and legal functions for companies are on the 
front lines in the battle against fraud and corruption. They often 
are privy to the very kinds of specific, timely, and credible 
information that can prevent an imminent fraud or stop an 
ongoing one.”191 As a result, they may be eligible for awards, “if 
their companies fail to take appropriate, timely action on 
information they first reported internally.”192 
In April 2015, the SEC announced the award of between $1.4–
$1.6 million to a whistleblowing compliance employee who 
provided information for an enforcement action against the 
employee’s company.193 In its announcement, the SEC further 
clarified the application of the incentive program to compliance 
personnel,194 emphasizing that receipt of a whistleblower award 
requires the submission of information that derives from the 
whistleblower’s “independent knowledge or independent 
analysis.”195 This provision seems to restrict the eligibility of audit 
and compliance personnel. As the SEC explains, unless an 
exception applies, “[t]he Commission will not consider information 
                                                                                                     
companies were among the clients with the problematic accounting, no entity 
regulated by the SEC was involved. See id. at *7 (“For Reyher, the connection 
between Grant Thornton and its public company clients is little more than a 
coincidence.”). Thus, the whistleblower was not protected by Dodd–Frank or SOX. 
Id. 
 190. See Press Release, SEC Announces $300,000 Award to Audit and 
Compliance Professional Who Reported Company’s Wrongdoing, U.S. SEC. & 
EXCHANGE COMMISSION (Aug. 29, 2014), https://www.sec.gov/news/press-
release/2014-180#.VAID3Eh2eos (last visited Apr. 14, 2018) (announcing the 
whistleblower award) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 191. Id.  
 192. Id. 
 193. See In re Claim for Award in Connection with [Redacted] [Redacted], 
Exchange Act Release No. 74781 (Apr. 22, 2015) (Whistleblower Award 
Proceeding), https://www.sec.gov/rules/other/2015/34-74781.pdf (ordering “that 
Claimant shall receive [Redacted] of the monetary sanctions collected in this 
Covered Action”). 
 194. See id. at 1 n.1 (applying the provisions of Section 21F). 
 195. Id.  
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to be derived from [a whistleblower’s] independent knowledge or 
independent analysis” if the whistleblower “obtained the 
information because” the whistleblower was “[a]n employee whose 
principal duties involve compliance or internal audit 
responsibilities.”196 
In the case at hand, however, an exception did apply. The SEC 
Claims Review Staff found that the employee “had a reasonable 
basis to believe that disclosure of the information to the [SEC] 
[was] necessary to prevent the [company] from engaging in conduct 
that [was] likely to cause substantial injury to the financial 
interest or property of the [company] or investors,” and therefore 
qualified for the exception in the rule.197 Andrew Ceresney, 
then-Director of the SEC’s enforcement division, noted that the 
compliance officer provided the information to the SEC “after 
responsible management at the entity became aware of potentially 
impending harm to investors and failed to take steps to prevent 
it.”198 
In addition to audit and compliance personnel, there have 
been questions regarding attorney eligibility for whistleblower 
bounty awards. The 2011 Regulations provide that—for purposes 
of satisfying the Dodd–Frank requirement that a whistleblower 
provide independently derived original information—the SEC will 
not consider information obtained through a communication that 
was subject to the attorney-client privilege, unless disclosure of 
that information would otherwise be permitted pursuant to 
(1) Section 205.3(d)(2) of the SEC’s Standards of Professional 
Conduct for Attorneys, (2) applicable state attorney conduct rules, 
or (3) “otherwise.”199 Thus, although the default position is that 
attorneys are ineligible to receive bounties in connection with 
                                                                                                     
 196. Id. (explaining the provisions of Section 21F-4(b)(4)(iii)(B)).  
 197. See id. at 2 n.1 (internal quote omitted).  
 198. Richard L. Cassin, Compliance Officer Awarded $1.5 Million under SEC 
Whistleblower Program, FCPA BLOG (Apr. 22, 2015, 11:28 AM), 
http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2015/4/22/compliance-officer-awarded-15-million-
under-sec-whistleblowe.html (last visited Dec. 26, 2017) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 199. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.21F-4(b)(4)(i)–240.21F-4(b)(4)(ii) (2018) 
(explaining the requirement). 
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information they learn in the course of representing a client,200 
there are certain situations in which an attorney may nevertheless 
be eligible for an award.  
First, an attorney would be eligible if she provided information 
to the SEC permitted under Section 205.3(d)(2) of the Standards of 
Professional Conduct for Attorneys.201 Section 205.3(d)(2), adopted 
by the SEC in 2003, provides that:  
(2) An attorney appearing and practicing before the 
Commission in the representation of an issuer may reveal to the 
Commission, without the issuer’s consent, confidential 
information related to the representation to the extent the 
attorney reasonably believes necessary: 
(i) To prevent the issuer from committing a material violation 
that is likely to cause substantial injury to the financial interest 
or property of the issuer or investors;  
(ii) To prevent the issuer, in a Commission investigation or 
administrative proceeding from committing perjury . . . ; 
suborning perjury . . . ; or committing any act . . . that is likely 
to perpetrate a fraud upon the Commission; or  
(iii) To rectify the consequences of a material violation by the 
issuer that caused, or may cause, substantial injury to the 
financial interest or property of the issuer or investors in the 
furtherance of which the attorney’s services were used.202 
Section 205 provides “permissive disclosure options” on which an 
attorney may rely when reporting confidential client information 
to the SEC and seeking a whistleblower incentive award.203 
Second, an attorney would be eligible for an award if her action 
in informing the SEC were permitted by applicable state attorney 
                                                                                                     
 200. See Jennifer M. Pacella, Advocate or Adversary? When Attorneys Act as 
Whistleblowers, 28 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1027, 1045–50 (2015) (setting out the 
conflicts of interest that result from allowing attorneys to collect whistleblower 
bounties).  
 201. See 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(d)(2) (offering the circumstances under which 
attorneys are eligible to receive bounties). 
 202. Id. 
 203. See Jennifer M. Pacella, Conflicted Counselors: Retaliation Protections 
for Attorney-Whistleblowers in an Inconsistent Regulatory Regime, 33 YALE J. ON 
REG. 491, 496 (2016) [hereinafter Pacella, Conflicted Counselors] (detailing “the 
permissive disclosure options of the Part 205 Rules to report confidential client 
information to the SEC for a financial reward”).  
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conduct rules.204 Although all state rules prohibit attorneys from 
knowingly revealing information relating to the representation of 
a client without the consent of the client, virtually all states also 
recognize exceptions to this duty based on the state’s interest in 
preventing harm to third persons resulting from the client’s illegal 
or fraudulent acts.205  
The third situation in which an attorney would be eligible for 
an award, “otherwise,”206 remains unclear. It was not explained in 
the SEC’s Adopting Release for the 2011 Regulations, and has not 
been clarified since. At the very least, “otherwise” would seem to 
give the SEC discretion to consider privileged information when 
circumstances, in the judgment of the SEC, warrant it. 
There are some indications that anti-retaliation provisions 
that ordinarily protect employees may also act to protect attorney 
whistleblowers.207 In February 2017, the former general counsel of 
Bio-Rad, Sanford “Sandy” Wadler, was awarded nearly $10 
million208 in damages for his firing by the company after he 
reported FCPA concerns relating to the company’s operations in 
China.209 In that case, the U.S. Magistrate Judge ruled that the 
                                                                                                     
 204. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-4(b)(4)(i) (making attorneys eligible for awards 
if “disclosure of that information would otherwise be permitted by any attorney 
pursuant to . . . the applicable state attorney conduct rules”). 
 205. See William McLucas et al., Attorneys Caught in the Ethical Crosshairs: 
Secretkeepers as Bounty Hunters Under the SEC Whistleblower Rules, 46 SEC. 
REG. & L. REP. 711, 714 (2014) (explicating that the harm can be “likely to result 
from a client’s illegal and/or fraudulent acts”). 
 206. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-4(b)(4)(i) (2018).  
 207. For an excellent discussion of retaliation protections for attorney 
whistleblowers, see generally Pacella, Conflicted Counselors, supra note 203. 
 208. There were subsequent reports that, because the back-pay amounts 
would be doubled, the original $8 million estimate was low. See Richard L. Cassin, 
FCPA Whistleblower: Former Bio-Rad GC Awarded $10 Million for Retaliatory 
Firing, FCPA BLOG (Feb. 7, 2017, 7:53 AM), http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2017/ 
2/7/fcpa-whistleblower-former-bio-rad-gc-awarded-10-million-for.html (last 
visited Dec. 26, 2017) (“[Wadler’s] lawyers at Kerr & Wagstaffe said the back pay 
damages will be doubled, resulting in a total award of $10.8 million.”) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 209. See Final Verdict Form at 3, Wadler v. Bio-Rad Labs, Inc., No. 
3:15-CV-02356 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 6, 2017), ECF No. 223 (showing that the jury 
answered affirmatively the question: “Was Mr. Wadler’s engaging in protected 
activity under the Sarbanes–Oxley Act a substantial motivating reason for 
Bio-Rad’s discharge of Mr. Wadler?”). 
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SOX whistleblower protections preempted attorney-client 
privilege.210  
3. Extraterritoriality 
A third issue for the SEC whistleblower bounty program of 
particular importance in the FCPA context is its application to 
foreign whistleblowers. In 2014, the Second Circuit in 
Liu-Meng-Lin decided that the Dodd–Frank whistleblower 
anti-retaliation provisions did not protect a foreign whistleblower 
who reported a potential violation of the FCPA.211 
However, the SEC has been clear that the incentive award 
system does apply to foreign whistleblowers. In September 2014, 
in a release concerning the largest award to that date ($30 million), 
the SEC reiterated that the bounty incentive program and the 
anti-retaliation provisions of Dodd–Frank have different 
congressional purposes, aligned with the two whistleblower 
descriptions or definitions in the law.212 As the SEC explained: 
In our view, there is a sufficient U.S. territorial nexus whenever 
a claimant’s information leads to the successful enforcement of 
a covered action brought in the United States, concerning 
violation of the U.S. securities law, by the Commission, the U.S. 
regulatory agency with enforcement authority for such 
violations. When these key territorial connections exist, it 
makes no difference whether, for example, the claimant was a 
foreign national, the claimant resides overseas, the information 
                                                                                                     
 210. See Judgment at 1–2, Wadler, No. 3:15-CV-02356, ECF No. 227 (ordering 
Wadler’s recovery); see also Melissa Maleske, GCs May Increasingly Blow the 
Whistle After Bio-Rad Verdict, LAW360 (Feb. 9, 2017, 8:39 PM), 
https://www.law360.com/articles/890360/gcs-may-increasingly-blow-the-whistle-
after-bio-rad-verdict (last visited Dec. 26, 2017) (“An $8 million federal jury 
verdict award for former Bio-Rad general counsel-turned-whistleblower Sanford 
Wadler may loosen the restrictions of GC privilege and embolden more in-house 
attorneys to come forward as whistleblowers against their companies, attorneys 
say.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 211. See id. at 177 (dismissing the complaint by a plaintiff who was a citizen 
and resident of Taiwan).  
 212. See In re Claim for Award in Connection with [Redacted] [Redacted], 
Exchange Act Release No. 74781 (Apr. 22, 2015) (Whistleblower Award 
Proceeding), https://www.sec.gov/rules/other/2015/34-74781.pdf (ordering the 
award).  
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was submitted from overseas, or the misconduct comprising the 
U.S. securities law violation occurred entirely overseas.213  
The SEC further explained that this extraterritorial approach is 
consistent with the congressional purpose of motivating persons 
with inside knowledge of violations to come forward.214 For 
purposes of the incentive award system, determinative factors are 
whether the whistleblower voluntarily provides original 
information to the SEC that leads to a successful enforcement 
action with a fine in excess of $1,000,000,215 not nationality or 
location. In fact, with respect to enforcement of the FCPA, the most 
likely whistleblowers are located outside the United States.216 
SEC efforts to incentivize foreign whistleblowers with the 
bounty system have been fairly successful. In fiscal year 2017, the 
whistleblower program received tips from individuals in 114 
countries outside of the United States,217 and the SEC estimated 
that approximately 12% of the individuals participating in the 
program were located abroad.218  
                                                                                                     
 213. Id. at 2 n.2. The same award release also declined to follow the stricter 
territorial approach that the Second Circuit had adopted in Liu v. Siemens. See 
id. (allowing the award “notwithstanding the existence of certain aspects of 
Claimant’s application”). 
 214. See id. (citing S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 110 (2010)). Note, however, that 
the court in Liu Meng-Lin v. Siemens stated that the bounty provision applies 
extraterritorially because of regulations promulgated by the SEC, not because of 
Congressional intent. See Liu Meng-Lin v. Siemens AG, 763 F.3d 175, 182–83 (2d 
Cir. 2014) (“17 C.F.R. § 240.21F–8(c)(2) does not mention the anti-retaliation 
provision, and indeed, other SEC regulations suggest that the requirements of 
the anti-retaliation and bounty provisions are to be considered separately.”). 
 215. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(3) (2012) (defining “original information”). 
 216. See Jeffrey Mathis, Protecting the Brave: Why Congress Should Amend 
the Dodd–Frank Act to Better Protect FCPA Whistleblowers, 49 J. MARSHALL L. 
REV. 829, 838 (2016) (“In recent years, the DOJ and SEC have dramatically 
increased FCPA enforcement, especially internationally. Between 2005 and 2010, 
more than half of the companies that were involved in FCPA resolutions were 
either foreign companies or U.S. subsidiaries of foreign companies.”).  
 217. See SEC, 2017 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 16, at 26 (depicting a map 
reflecting the countries from which whistleblower tips came in fiscal year 2017).  
 218. See id. at 33 (displaying a chart of whistleblower tips by country in fiscal 
year 2017).  
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IV. The Morality of Whistleblowing Incentives 
Perceptions of corporate whistleblowing vary. In the era of 
Wikileaks and Edward Snowden, some see whistleblowers as 
heroes, defenders of law, morality, and values more important 
than company loyalty.219 Others, however, see them as traitors and 
violators of their duty of loyalty to their organizations.220 In 
addition, some scholars argue that monetary incentives for 
whistleblowing may ultimately decrease reporting of illegal 
activity.221  
A. The Ethics of Whistleblowing 
One way to understand corporate whistleblowing is as a 
contest between duty toward the public and duty toward the 
employer. In this understanding, whistleblowing is the 
individual’s moral obligation to society. Individuals have a public 
duty to report lawbreaking, whether it is a street crime or a 
violation of the FCPA.222 At the same time, whistleblowing is the 
decision to defy one’s superiors and (sometimes) harm one’s 
                                                                                                     
 219. See generally Joyce Rothschild & Terance D. Miethe, Whistle-Blower 
Disclosures and Management Retaliation: The Battle to Control Information 
About Organization Corruption, 26 WORK & OCCUPATIONS 107 (1999).  
 220. See Frank J. Cavico, Private Sector Whistleblowing and the 
Employment-At-Will Doctrine: A Comparative Legal, Ethical, and Pragmatic 
Analysis, 45 S. TEX. L. REV. 543, 642 (2004) (“Whistleblowing employees often are 
vilified as ‘snitches,’ ‘informants’ (and most regrettably in the new federal law), 
and ‘traitors,’ and consequently may be shunned, ‘blackballed,’ or threatened or 
even harmed by fellow employees for not being loyal ‘team-players.’”).  
 221. See Naseem Faqihi, Note, Choosing Which Rule to Break First: An 
In-House Attorney Whistleblower’s Choices After Discovering A Possible Federal 
Securities Law Violation, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 3341, 3350–51 (2014) 
(“Whistleblowers acting in response to a duty to report can be viewed in a better 
light than those who act—or are perceived to act—in response to a monetary 
reward . . . this perceived motivation is in turn affected by how whistleblowers 
are incentivized.”). 
 222. See David B. Wilkins, In Defense of Law and Morality: Why Lawyers 
Should Have a Prima Facie Duty to Obey the Law, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 269, 
286 (1996) (arguing for the existence of an underlying “prima facie duty to obey 
the law” for all).  
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institution.223 All employees are agents of their organization, and 
so owe a fiduciary duty of loyalty to the employer.224 Employees or 
agents thus have a legal duty to act loyally for the benefit of their 
employer/principal in all matters connected with that agency.225  
Whistleblowing thus involves weighing one’s duty to society 
vis-à-vis one’s duty of loyalty to the organization.226 A study 
published in the Journal of Experimental Psychology showed that 
persons who witnessed unethical behavior and reported it used ten 
times as many terms related to “fairness” and “justice.”227 
Participants who witnessed unethical behavior and did not report 
it used twice as many terms related to “loyalty.”228 The study went 
on to demonstrate that emphasizing “fairness” might in some cases 
influence people’s decisions regarding reporting violations that 
they witness.229 The study suggested that such an emphasis in 
corporate mission statements and codes could change employees’ 
decisionmaking in the whistleblowing context.230 
                                                                                                     
 223. See Lobel, supra note 52, at 434 (“[W]histleblowing requires an 
individual to defy immediate authorities, even when the information disclosed is 
sensitive and its exposure may harm the organization.”).  
 224. See Leslie L. Cooney, Employee Fiduciary Duties: One Size Does Not Fit 
All, 79 MISS. L.J. 853, 854 (2010) (“As agents of the employers, all employees owe 
broad fiduciary duties to their employers.”).  
 225. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.01 (AM. LAW INST. 2006) 
(recognizing that this fiduciary duty extends to “all matters connected with the 
agency relationship”). 
 226. See Gregory Liyanarachchi & Chris Newdick, The Impact of Moral 
Reasoning and Retaliation on Whistle-Blowing: New Zealand Evidence, 89 J. BUS. 
ETHICS 37, 40 (2009) (arguing that “employees face an extremely difficult choice 
between their loyalty to the organization on the one hand and their moral and 
social obligations to do the right thing and potential personal consequences of 
blowing the whistle on the other”).  
 227. Adam Waytz et al., The Whistle-Blower’s Quandary, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4, 
2013, at SR12. For the study underlying the article, see generally Adam Waytz et 
al., The Whistleblower’s Dilemma and the Fairness-Loyalty Tradeoff, 49 J. 
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCH. 1027 (2013).  
 228. See Adam Waytz et al., The Whistleblower’s Dilemma and the 
Fairness-Loyalty Tradeoff, 49 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCH. 1027, 1027 (2013) 
(“[W]e propose that differences in people’s valuation of moral norms, fairness 
versus loyalty, contribute to whistleblowing decisions.”).  
 229. See id. at 1031–32 (indicating the influence of moral norms).  
 230. See id. at 1032 (discussing the implications of the study). 
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Such a schematic understanding of two opposed duties tends 
to obscure other considerations. What about an individual’s duty 
to herself: the risk of harm to the employee from reporting?231 What 
about the family and others who rely on the employee? What about 
the possibility that the employer itself, and many fellow 
employees, might be harmed by the disclosure? How are such 
considerations to be “balanced” against the rather unspecific 
societal harm of violation of the securities laws? In the FCPA 
context, the societal harms—improper yet often-customary 
payments made in another country—may seem particularly 
amorphous. 
In fact, the difficulty of grappling with such questions may 
discourage whistleblowing. A New Zealand study232 showed that 
individuals with higher propensities for moral reasoning are more 
likely to blow the whistle than are individuals with lower levels of 
moral reasoning.233 Actually reporting, as opposed to staying 
silent, would thus seem to be correlated with the difficulty of the 
decision. 
From this perspective, a bounty system simplifies the ethical 
calculus. Concerns about dependents and oneself are ameliorated 
by cash payment. More deeply, the critique of bounties—that they 
reduce the ethical quality of the employee’s decision to blow the 
whistle—may be just the point. Whistleblowers, acting in a 
corporate context, can truthfully say to themselves that they made 
a rationally self-interested decision. Bounties thus raise the 
question of whistleblowing for less than purely principled reasons, 
with impure hearts and unclean hands, rather than out of a sense 
of public duty. 
                                                                                                     
 231. See Mathieu Bouville, Whistle-Blowing and Morality, 81 J. BUS. ETHICS 
579, 582 (2007) (evaluating the moral complications of reporting).  
 232. The New Zealand study used accounting students as surrogates for their 
professional counterparts. For a discussion of the use of students in empirical 
research in the context of corporate disclosures, see Linda Espahbodi, Reza 
Espahbodi, Norma Juma & Amy Deen Westbrook, Does Inclusion of 
Sustainability Priorities in Corporate Strategy Matter to Investors (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 233. See Liyanarachchi & Newdick, supra note 226, at 44 (demonstrating that 
the impact of the level of moral reasoning on participants’ propensity to blow the 
whistle increases substantially when they anticipate strong retaliation). 
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B. Impure Hearts and Unclean Hands 
Understanding whistleblowing as a public duty has its uses, 
but also obscures the possibility that whistleblowers may properly 
report violations for improper reasons. If whistleblowing is 
justified only when a person acts out of public duty, with purity of 
heart,234 then whistleblower bounties may be not only 
unnecessary, but also wrong.235 On the other hand, doing the right 
thing for the public interest, i.e., reporting violations of law for the 
wrong reason, is still doing the right thing for the public interest.236 
So it is difficult to argue, from a public policy perspective, that 
disclosures of FCPA violations are only worthwhile if made for 
altruistic reasons. In August 2012, NCR Corporation (NCR) 
complained about the motivations of a “purported whistleblower” 
who alleged that company sales practices in China, the Middle 
East, and Africa might have violated the FCPA.237 Nevertheless, 
the SEC undertook a three-year investigation, eventually 
declining to recommend an enforcement action.238 Regardless of 
                                                                                                     
 234. Douglas Oliver, Whistle-Blowing Engineer, 129 J. PROF. ISSUES IN 
ENGINEERING EDUC. & PRAC. 246, 246–56 (2003) (“Whistle-blowing is an activity 
that should only be entered into with pure motives.”); see Bouville, supra note 
231, at 584 (“There is a tendency to construe whistle-blowing as mandatory and 
whistle blowers as heroes, even though these are logically incompatible.”).  
 235. See Colin Grant, Whistle-Blowers: Saints of Secular Culture, 39 J. BUS. 
ETHICS 391, 392 (2002) (arguing that if a person blows the whistle in anticipation 
of a reward, the ethical quality of the act is compromised); Bouville, supra note 
231, at 584 (claiming that if whistleblowing is a “moral obligation,” then rewards 
are incompatible with this responsibility).  
 236. See Bouville, supra note 231, at 583 (asking “if someone saves my life out 
of revenge or greed, should I not say ‘thank you’ rather than ‘this was wrong, 
never do it again’?”); Thomas L. Carson et al., Whistle-Blowing for Profit: An 
Ethical Analysis of the Federal False Claims Act, 77 J. BUS. ETHICS 361 (2008) 
(contending that “having good motives is not necessary for being morally justified 
in whistle-blowing”). 
 237. See Chris Matthews & Sam Rubenfeld, NCR Investigates Alleged FCPA 
Allegations, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 13, 2012, 5:02 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/corruption-
currents/2012/08/13/ncr-investigates-alleged-fcpa-violations/ (last visited Dec. 28, 
2017) (stating “NCR has certain concerns about the veracity and accuracy of the 
allegations”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 238. See Richard L. Cassin, NCR: SEC Declination Three Years After 
Whistleblower Complaint, FCPA BLOG (Aug. 6, 2015, 8:08 AM), 
http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2015/8/6/ncr-sec-declination-three-years-after-whistle 
blower-complain.html (last visited Dec. 28, 2017) (quoting NCR as saying that it 
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the merits of the allegations, why do the employee’s motives 
matter?  
What if the employee is actually culpable? On June 13, 2017, 
the U.S. House of Representatives passed the Financial Choice 
Act, which was intended to rewrite much of Dodd–Frank.239 Among 
other things, the proposed overhaul would prevent the SEC from 
rewarding “culpable” whistleblowers who took part in the 
misconduct they reported.240 In addition to the political hurdles 
that the proposed legislation ultimately faced, some attorneys 
objected to the change based on the adverse effect on ordinary 
Americans and shareholders that would result from fewer 
whistleblowers.241  
It may be the case that an individual’s desire for profit or 
revenge is more likely to promote the public interest in reporting 
than an individual’s virtuous desire to support the law.242 However, 
                                                                                                     
had been “informed by the staff of the [SEC] that [the SEC] d[id] not intend to 
recommend an enforcement action” (internal quote omitted)) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 239. See Financial Choice Act of 2017, H.R. 10, 115th Cong. (2018) (stating 
that part of the purpose of the Act is to “repeal[] the provisions of the Dodd–Frank 
Act that make America less prosperous, less stable, and less free”).  
 240. See id. § 828, Denial of Award to Culpable Whistleblowers (preventing 
bounty payments “to any whistleblower who is responsible for, or complicit in, the 
violation of the securities laws for which the whistleblower provided information 
to the Commission”).  
 241. See Jasmine Ye Han, Dodd–Frank Overhaul Could Spark Rebound in 
SOX Whistle-Blower Cases, BLOOMBERG BNA (June 5, 2017), 
https://www.bna.com/doddfrank-overhaul-spark-n73014451928/ (last visited Dec. 
29, 2017) (arguing that “the overhaul envisioned in the Financial Choice Act could 
have one unintended consequence: a possible rebound in the number of SOX 
whistle-blower claims filed against companies”) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review).  
 242. See Bouville, supra note 231, at 587 (“As Mandeville . . . pointed out, 
greed and other flaws of character may give better results than virtue.”). In 1705, 
Bernard Mandeville published the poem, The Fable of the Bees Or Private Vices, 
Publick Benefits, with the book. See id. (asserting this proposition). Mandeville 
explained the moral as the: 
[I]mpossibility of enjoying all the most elegant comforts of life that are 
to be met with in an industrious, wealthy and powerful nation, and at 
the same time, be blessed with all the virtue and innocence that can be 
wished for in a golden age; from thence to expose the unreasonableness 
and folly of those, that desirous of being an opulent and flourishing 
people and wonderfully greedy after all the benefits they can receive 
as such, are yet always murmuring at and exclaiming against those 
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should whistleblower incentives be rejected based on an ideal of 
the ethical purity of the whistleblower, even though they may 
decrease corruption? What is at issue here: institutional corruption 
or individual virtue? 
Such questions are difficult to address in the abstract; they are 
almost always situated in specific contexts. Different approaches 
to conflicts between organizational loyalty and legal compliance 
may reveal cultural and legal ambivalences about administrative 
law, transparency, and individual dissent in group settings.243 
Moral analysis of the Dodd–Frank whistleblower incentive system 
is therefore particularly tricky in the FCPA context, where 
reporting often happens in fields contested among various U.S. and 
non-U.S. attitudes and interests.  
C. The Impact of Whistleblower Incentives: Does Paying for 
Altruistic Behavior Reduce It? 
Assuming that many whistleblowers report for altruistic 
reasons still raises questions regarding the appropriateness of 
monetary incentives. Is it right to pay someone to do the right 
thing? Some scholars have argued that whistleblower bounties 
may have inadvertent counterproductive effects.244 Rather than 
triggering internal motivations of potential reporting individuals, 
“framing the reporting behavior as a commodity [by paying a 
monetary award] may actually crowd out, or suppress, internal 
                                                                                                     
vices and inconveniences that from the beginning of the world to this 
present day have been inseparable from all kingdoms and states that 
ever were famed for strength, riches, and politeness, at the same time. 
Id.  
 243. See Lobel, supra note 52, at 436 (“By introducing parallel analyses in the 
debates in the area of family ties in criminal procedure, civic disobedience and 
illegal orders in military settings, and professional roles and legal ethics, the 
Article illuminates the pervasive need to connect between substance and 
form . . . .”).  
 244. See Yuval Feldman & Orly Lobel, The Incentives Matrix: The 
Comparative Effectiveness of Rewards, Liabilities, Duties and Protections for 
Reporting Illegal Activity, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1151, 1151 (2010) (introducing a study 
that “offers important practical findings about the costs and benefits of different 
regulatory systems, including findings about inadvertent counterproductive 
effects of certain legal incentives”). 
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moral motivation.”245 The idea of motivational crowding suggests 
that external monetary rewards or punishments may undermine 
intrinsic motivations driven by an individual’s sense of moral or 
civic duty;246 for example, monetary incentives for charitable acts 
may decrease principled behavior.247 Studies show that when 
children are motivated to perform altruistic acts through an appeal 
to their self-interest, if the reward is removed, there is no longer 
any desire to continue performing the task.248  
Reducing “the right thing” to a cost-benefit analysis, or a 
competition, may be appropriate and effective when applied to a 
company’s motivation,249 but just the opposite when applied to the 
motivations of people who work there. One recent study has shown 
that the motivational crowding resulting from financial incentives 
for whistleblowers combined with a minimum dollar threshold for 
payment of those incentives may inhibit reporting of frauds falling 
below the threshold amount.250  
                                                                                                     
 245. See id. at 1155 (reporting the results of a series of experimental surveys 
of a representative panel of more than 2,000 employees).  
 246. See id. at 1179 (stressing this theory); EDWARD L. DECI & RICHARD M. 
RYAN, INTRINSIC MOTIVATION AND SELF-DETERMINATION IN HUMAN BEHAVIOR 43 
(1985) (distinguishing extrinsic motivation linked to external factors, such as 
financial incentives, and intrinsic motivation driven by an individual’s sense of 
morality or duty); see also BRUNO S. FREY, NOT JUST FOR THE MONEY: AN ECONOMIC 
THEORY OF PERSONAL MOTIVATION 11 (1997) (arguing that “the money offer 
crowds-out the citizens’ motivation to do anything for the common good”).  
 247. See Feldman & Lobel, supra note 244, at 1179 (“For example, paying 
people in return for their blood might lead donors to view the event as a 
transaction rather than a charitable act, thereby eroding altruistic blood 
donations.”).  
 248. See, e.g., Alfie Kohn, The Wrong Way to Get People to Do the Right Thing, 
PSYCHOL. TODAY (May 7, 2015), https://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/the-
homework-myth/201505/the-wrong-way-get-people-do-the-right-thing (last 
visited Dec. 29, 2017) (arguing that appealing to self-interest, such as using 
rewards, makes people less helpful) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review).  
 249. See, e.g., Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 204 Mich. 459, 507 (Mich. 1919) 
(articulating the shareholder wealth maximization doctrine); Theodora Holding 
Corp. v. Henderson, 257 A.2d 398, 405 (Del. Ch. 1969) (establishing a 
reasonableness test for corporate charitable donations).  
 250. See Leslie Berger et al., Hijacking the Moral Imperative: How Financial 
Incentives Can Discourage Whistleblower Reporting, AUDITING: J. PRAC. & 
THEORY, Aug. 2017, at 1, 2 (conducting the experiment that explores this 
inhibition on whistleblowing).  
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V. Corporate Whistleblower Incentives in the United States and 
Other Legal Cultures 
A. U.S. Enthusiasm for Whistleblower Incentives 
As mentioned, the United States has encouraged 
whistleblowing since its founding. Whistleblowing is an important 
aspect of law enforcement in the United States in securities law 
and in a range of other contexts. Concomitantly, the United States 
has a long tradition of encouraging and rewarding tipsters.251 As 
discussed below, the United States has several “bounty” programs 
in the corporate whistleblowing context apart from the incentive 
programs established by Dodd–Frank. These include the False 
Claims Act, the IRS reporting program, and a now-defunct SEC 
Office of the Inspector General program for reports of insider 
trading. In addition, a whistleblower award program was 
established by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (the 
CFTC) at the same time as the SEC program.  
 In light of this tradition, the establishment of the Dodd–
Frank whistleblower incentive system is unsurprising. 
Congressional debate over Dodd–Frank included assertions that 
monetary incentives will increase reporting of illegal activity. 
Then-Senator Richard Shelby (R-Ala.) stated that “the guaranteed 
massive minimum payments and limited SEC flexibility ensures 
that a line of claimants will form at the SEC’s door.”252 Still, the 
U.S enthusiasm for whistleblowing incentives is unique.253  
 
                                                                                                     
 251. The idea that the government should pay for the information it requires 
to enforce the law also runs deep in U.S. legal culture outside the securities law 
context. Consider the common practice of paying informants.  
 252. 156 CONG. REC. S4076 (daily ed. May 20, 2010).  
 253. See Boyne, supra note 42, at 279, 280 (“[W]hen the Federal Claims Act 
was amended in 1986 to increase the likelihood that a whistleblower would 
receive a financial award, the number of FACA reports of false claims for 
government funds increased from an average of 6 per year to almost 2 per day in 
1999.”).  
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B. Other Federal Corporate Whistleblower Incentive Programs 
1. The False Claims Act 
Qui tam suits under the False Claims Act (FCA)254 are perhaps 
the first example of a U.S. federal law offering a monetary 
incentive for employees to report illegal behavior externally.255 The 
FCA was enacted in 1863 to target Union contractors defrauding 
the Lincoln Administration during the Civil War.256 The FCA 
enables a whistleblower, as private citizen, to sue a business that 
is defrauding the U.S. government and to recover funds on the 
government’s behalf.257 The FCA rewards the whistleblower whose 
suit recovers government funds and protects her from retaliation, 
recognizing the risks she undertakes to stop fraud against the 
government.258 Under the False Claims Act Reform Act of 1986, if 
found liable under the FCA, a business must pay as much as three 
times the government’s losses, plus penalties, for each false 
claim.259 The DOJ may intervene in the case, but regardless, if 
funds are recovered by the government, the whistleblower qui tam 
plaintiff (known as the “relator”) is entitled to 15%–30% of the 
recovery, depending on the circumstances.260 
                                                                                                     
 254. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–3733 (2012).  
 255. See id. § 3730(d) (providing for a 15%–25% whistleblower bounty if the 
government intervenes in the action, and a 25%–30% bounty if the whistleblower 
litigates the case to completion without the government).  
 256. See Boyne, supra note 42, at 285 (stating that government fraud is not 
only a contemporary phenomenon in response to increased federalization, but also 
a historical one that traces back to the Civil War era); Markey & Azorsky, supra 
note 104 (identifying the Act’s intent to target private defense contractor fraud 
during the Civil War).  
 257. In addition to the federal False Claims Act, approximately thirty states 
have enacted versions of the statute to allow individuals to bring similar lawsuits 
in state courts.  
 258. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730 (providing the procedures, rights, and protections 
granted to relators who bring a civil action under the Act); Boyne, supra note 42, 
at 287–88 (describing the incentives and protections of whistleblowers under the 
False Claims Act).  
 259. See id. § 3729(1), (3) (setting the penalties for a person found guilty of 
government fraud).  
 260. See id. § 3730(d) (permitting prevailing relators to recover attorneys’ fees 
and reasonable expenses in addition to the bounty).  
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Some of the best-known whistleblower bounties have been 
paid in the FCA context. In 2009, the DOJ awarded six 
whistleblowers bounties totaling over $100 million in connection 
with an investigation into Pfizer Inc.’s promotion of certain 
pharmaceutical products.261 In 2010, Cheryl Eckhard was awarded 
$96 million for reporting information relating to irregularities at 
GlaxoSmithKline’s manufacturing facility in Puerto Rico.262 FCA 
cases are common. In fiscal year 2017, the U.S. government 
recovered over $3.7 billion from civil FCA cases.263 Of the total 
recovered in 2017, $3.4 billion was attributed to 669 qui tam 
lawsuits.264 The government awarded the whistleblowers a total of 
$392 million.265 
2. Internal Revenue Service Whistleblower Informant Award 
Program 
Another well-known U.S. federal whistleblower incentive 
program is run by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS).266 The IRS 
                                                                                                     
 261. See LIPMAN, supra note 63, at 45–46 (“[Pfizer] had agreed to pay $2.3 
billion, the largest healthcare fraud settlement in the history of the Department 
of Justice, to resolve criminal and civil liability arising from the illegal promotion 
of certain pharmaceutical products.”).  
 262. See Peter Howe, Whistleblower Wins $96 Million in GlaxoSmithKline 
Case, NBCUNIVERSAL (Mar. 21, 2014), http://www.necn.com/news/new-
england/_NECN__Whistleblower_Wins_96_Million_in_GlaxoSmithKline_Case_
NECN-251401891.html (last visited Jan. 10, 2018) (detailing the 
GlaxoSmithKline case, in which the company had to pay a $750 million penalty 
for drug manufacturing lapses) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 263. See Press Release, Justice Department Recovers $3.7 Billion From False 
Claims Act Cases in Fiscal Year 2017, U.S. DEP’T JUST. (Dec. 21, 2017), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-recovers-over-37-billion-false-
claims-act-cases-fiscal-year-2017 (last visited Apr. 14, 2018) (detailing the types 
and amounts of recoveries from the False Claims Act in 2017) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 264. See id. (“The number of lawsuits filed under the qui tam provisions of the 
Act has grown significantly since 1986, with 669 qui tam suits filed this past 
year—an average of more than 12 new cases every week.”).  
 265. See id. (stating that whistleblowers “are often essential to uncovering the 
truth”). 
 266. See 26 U.S.C. § 7623 (2012) (providing awards to whistleblowers who 
expose tax underpayments or violations of the Internal Revenue Code).  
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offers percentages of recovered taxes to those who report tax 
evasion.267 This program, which was put into place over thirty 
years ago, requires the IRS to pay whistleblower awards of 15%–
30% of collected proceeds (e.g., tax, penalties, interest and other 
amounts) that result from an action in which the Treasury 
Department acts based on information provided by the 
whistleblower and collects more than $2,000,000.268 In 2006, 
Congress established a whistleblower office within the IRS to 
administer those awards.269  
The IRS has recovered billions of dollars in federal taxes based 
on whistleblower tips, and pays out millions of dollars in rewards 
each year.270 In August 2014, the Department of the Treasury 
issued new regulations271 that expand its whistleblower reward 
program, increasing the amount of potential rewards by expanding 
the definition of collected proceeds.272 The IRS whistleblower office 
made 242 awards in fiscal year 2017 totaling more than $33.9 
million.273  
                                                                                                     
 267. See id. (providing that whistleblowers will receive between 15%–30% of 
the settlement award).  
 268. See id. § 7623(b)(5)(B) (stating that this awards subsection applies to any 
action “if the tax, penalties, interest, additions to tax, and additional amounts in 
dispute exceed $2,000,000”); Whistleblower—Informant Award, IRS, 
http://www.irs.gov/uac/Whistleblower-Informant-Award (last updated Jan. 5, 
2018) (last visited Jan. 10, 2018) (detailing the information about submitting a 
claim and the rules for receiving a reward) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review). Awards under 15% may be made when the collected proceeds are 
below the $2,000,000 threshold. Id. 
 269. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., IRS WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM FISCAL 
YEAR 2017 REPORT TO THE CONGRESS 5 (2017) [hereainfter IRS, FISCAL YEAR 2017] 
(“[T]he Whistleblower Office coordinates with other IRS units, analyzes 
information submitted, and makes award determinations.”).  
 270. See id. at 3 (stating that whistleblowers have assisted the IRS in 
collecting $3.6 billion in revenue since 2007).  
 271. 79 Fed. Reg. 47,235 (Aug. 12, 2014) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 301).  
 272. See 26 U.S.C. § 7623(b) (2012) (stating that a whistleblower receives “as 
an award at least 15 percent but not more than 30 percent of the collected 
proceeds (including penalties, interest, additions to tax, and additional amounts) 
resulting from the action”). Collected proceeds can include taxes, penalties, 
interest, and additional amounts collected by reason of the information provided, 
as well as the impact of other tax attributes such as net operating losses.  
 273. See IRS, FISCAL YEAR 2017, supra note 269, at 3 (stating that this brings 
the total monetary awards paid to whistleblowers since 2007 up to $499 million). 
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3. Other U.S. Whistleblower Incentive Programs 
In addition, Dodd–Frank created a whistleblower office and 
incentive program at the CFTC that mirrors the SEC program. The 
CFTC whistleblower program provides monetary awards to people 
who provide original information about Commodity Exchange Act 
violations that lead to enforcement actions with over $1,000,000 in 
sanctions. The CFTC Whistleblower Program was amended in 
May 2017 to clarify, among other things, that a claimant is not 
required to be the original source of information received by the 
CFTC; to add foreign futures authorities to the list of specified 
authorities to which a claimant may provide information before 
disclosing it to the CFTC without losing original source status; and 
to extend the time frames in which a claimant may submit a tip 
form.274 To date, the CFTC has made forty-seven final 
determinations, resulting in four awards.275 
Other corporate whistleblower bounty schemes include the 
now-defunct Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement 
Act of 1988,276 which authorized the SEC to pay bounties of up to 
10% to persons who provided information that led to the imposition 
of penalties for illegal insider trading penalties.277 That program 
                                                                                                     
 274. See CFTC Adopts Amendments to Whistleblower Program, PRAC. L. FIN. 









updated May 24, 2017) (last visited Jan. 26, 2018) (listing the amendments for 
whistleblower award eligibility) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 275. See Final Orders/Award Determinations, U.S. COMMODITIES FUTURES 
TRADING COMMISSION, https://www.whistleblower.gov/orders/ (last visited Mar. 8, 
2018) (containing the Final Orders of the Commission and related award 
determinations regarding complaint applications) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review).  
 276. Pub. L. No. 100-704, 102 Stat. 4677 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 78, 80 (2012)). 
 277. Id. § 21A(e). 
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was criticized for not being sufficiently generous. Between its 
inception in 1989 and 2010, it paid a total of $160,000 based on five 
claims.278 Although a payment of $1,000,000 was made in 2010,279 
the replacement of the program with the Dodd–Frank program 
transformed the SEC’s approach to tips.280 Not only are the 
rewards much larger, but the Dodd–Frank program is 
better-known, more user-friendly, and features easy 
communication with and prompt responses from the 
government.281  
There are a number of other U.S. federal whistleblower 
programs, including an act to prevent pollution from ships,282 the 
false patent marking statute,283 and parts of the U.S. Tariff Act of 
1930,284 as well as an array of state whistleblower false claims 
acts.285 There are also several states, including Indiana and Utah, 
that have followed the federal government’s lead and established 
securities law whistleblower bounty programs.286 A full analysis of 
those statutes is beyond the scope of this Article.  
                                                                                                     
 278. See generally OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, 
ASSESSMENT OF THE SEC’S BOUNTY PROGRAM (2010), 
https://www.sec.gov/files/474.pdf (detailing the results of the SEC’s assessment of 
the Commission’s bounty program); see also LIPMAN, supra note 63, at 13–14 
(stating that the “drafters of Dodd–Frank believed that the SEC had not been 
sufficiently generous in the past to whistleblowers”). 
 279. See LIPMAN, supra note 63, at 11–12 (stating that the award was for 
providing information on alleged illegal insider trading in Microsoft Corp. by a 
hedge fund manager and several Microsoft employees). 
 280. See id. at 12 (stating that Congress was influenced by the SEC’s failure 
to uncover the Madoff Ponzi scheme). 
 281. See Baer, supra note 10, at 2224–25 (“To implement the new program, 
the SEC created a new Office of the Whistleblower, which would educate the 
public and task a group of SEC agents with reviewing and monitoring tips.”). 
 282. See 33 U.S.C. § 1908 (2012) (establishing penalties for violating the Act 
and rewards for whistleblowers for information leading to conviction). 
 283. See 35 U.S.C. § 292 (establishing penalties for false marking of a patent).  
 284. See Pub. L. No. 71-361, 46 Stat. 590 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C 
§ 1619 (2012)) (establishing a reward for a whistleblower that furnishes 
information of customs fraud).  
 285. See State Whistleblower False Claims Laws, PHILLIPS & COHEN, 
https://www.phillipsandcohen.com/State-False-Claims-Statutes/ (last visited 
Jan. 11, 2018) (providing a full survey of U.S. whistleblower programs) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 286. See Gretchen Morgenson, To Crack Down on Securities Fraud, States 
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The existence of multiple whistleblower bounty programs does 
not prove universal U.S. support, or even acceptance of, 
whistleblowing, but it does demonstrate that the Dodd–Frank 
whistleblowing programs is not unusual and suggests a general 
acceptance of bounties in the United States. It is worth noting that 
the Time magazine “Persons of the Year” in 2002 were three 
whistleblowers: Cynthia Cooper of Worldcom, Coleen Rowley of the 
FBI, and Sherron Watkins of Enron.287 Similarly, on July 7, 2016, 
the U.S. Senate designated July 30, 2016 “National Whistleblower 
Appreciation Day.”288 
C. International Attitudes Towards Corporate Whistleblowing 
Incentives 
Many other countries take very different approaches to 
corporate whistleblowing. Much of the rest of the world lacks 
whistleblower incentives, or in many cases even basic 
protections.289 Consequently, given that the FCPA prohibits the 
                                                                                                     
Reward Whistle-Blowers, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 21, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2016/08/22/business/to-crack-down-on-securities-fraud-states-reward-whistle-
blowers.html?_r=0 (last visited Jan. 11, 2018) (“In the aftermath of the financial 
crisis, a growing army of confidential informants—better known as whistle-
blowers—has helped federal securities regulators identify and prosecute 
wrongdoers.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Press Release, 
A.G. Schneiderman Proposes Bill To Reward And Protect Whistleblowers Who 
Report Financial Crimes, N.Y ST. ATT’Y GEN. OFF. (Feb. 26, 2015), 
http://www.ag.ny.gov/press-release/ag-schneiderman-proposes-bill-reward-and-
protect-whistleblowers-who-report-financial (last visited Apr. 14, 2018) (stating 
that in 2015 that New York was considering such a whistleblower law) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 287. See Richard Lacayo & Amanda Ripley, Persons of the Year 2002: The 
Whistleblowers, TIME (Dec. 30, 2002), http://content.time.com/time/magazine/ 
article/0,9171,1003998,00.html (last visited Jan. 11, 2018) (detailing the collapse 
of Enron and the whistleblowers behind the takedown) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 288. See S. Res. 522, 114th Cong. (2016) (enacted) (designating July 30, 2016 
as “National Whistleblower Appreciation Day”). 
 289. See generally Gregor Thüsing & Gerrit Forst, Whistleblowing Around the 
World: A Comparative Analysis of Whistleblowing in 23 Countries, in 
WHISTLEBLOWING—A COMPARATIVE STUDY 1, 29 (Gregor Thüsing & Gerrit Forst 
eds., 2016) (pointing out that there is room for improvement even in the most 
advanced jurisdictions). Also consider, for example, the suspicious and unsolved 
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bribery of foreign officials, an FCPA whistleblower is likely to 
confront somewhat conflicting U.S. and foreign attitudes towards 
whistleblowing.  
Since the turn of the century, there have been some 
indications that international norms may be slowly shifting in the 
direction of U.S. law with respect to anti-retaliation protections. In 
2003, the United Nations opened the United Nations Convention 
Against Corruption for signature.290 The convention requires 
signatory countries to consider implementing whistleblower 
protections to encourage employees to report crimes by their 
employers.291 So far, 140 countries have signed.292  
In addition, a few other jurisdictions do have whistleblower 
incentive programs. In July 2016, the Ontario Securities 
Commission adopted a whistleblower program that tracks the 
Dodd–Frank program in certain key ways, including the payment 
of incentive awards.293 Under the Ontario program, eligible 
individuals who voluntarily submit information to the securities 
commission regarding a breach of Ontario securities law may 
receive a financial award.294 The whistleblower award may be 
payable if the information submitted was of meaningful assistance 
to the securities commission in investigating the matter and 
                                                                                                     
death of Russian whistleblower Sergei Magnitsky while in police custody. 
 290. See United Nations Convention Against Corruption, UNITED NATIONS 
OFF. ON DRUGS & CRIME, https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/corruption/ uncac.html 
(last visited Jan. 11, 2018) (describing the purposes and preventive measures of 
United Nations Convention against Corruption and the history of the instrument 
in the UN General Assembly) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 291. See Signature and Ratification Status, UNITED NATIONS OFF. ON DRUGS 
& CRIME (Oct. 3, 2017), https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/ 
signatories.html (last visited Jan. 11, 2018) (listing the signatories to the UN 
Convention against Corruption) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 292. Id. 
 293. See generally OSC POLICY 15-601, WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM (2016), 
http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/documents/en/Securities-Category1/20160714_15-601_ 
policy-whistleblower-program.pdf (detailing the purpose and interpretation of the 
Ontario Whistleblower Program). 
 294. See id. at 1 (“Under the Program, individuals who meet certain eligibility 
criteria and who voluntarily submit information to Commission Staff regarding a 
breach of Ontario securities law may be eligible for a whistleblower award.”).  
CASH FOR YOUR CONSCIENCE 1155 
obtaining a decision that resulted in a final order for monetary 
penalties of CAD$1,000,000 or more.295  
In South Korea, incentive awards are generally not allowed, 
but may be paid in limited circumstances by the responsible 
authorities to whistleblowers to prevent damage to public property 
or to help recover public property.296 Also, in 2015 it was reported 
that Russia was considering a whistleblower incentive award 
system.297 The Ministry of Labor drafted an amendment to the 
country’s anti-bribery law which would have entitled a person who 
reported a confirmed instance of graft a payment of up to 15% of 
the alleged damages to the state budget (capped at approximately 
$50,000).298  
In some Chinese provinces, the Administration for Industry 
and Commerce will pay whistleblowers the equivalent of anywhere 
from a few hundred to several thousand dollars for tips regarding 
bribery and corruption.299 However, the emergence of 
anti-corruption norms enforced by whistleblowing mechanisms 
appears to have met with some resistance.300 For example, local 
officials in China have been accused of blocking petitioners seeking 
                                                                                                     
 295. See id. (detailing the criteria for determining the whistleblower’s 
eligibility and the amount of the whistleblower award).  
 296. See Thüsing & Forst, supra note 42, at 1, 28 (stating that Asian countries 
overall are more reluctant to rewarding whistleblowers than European countries 
with South Korea being an outlier).  
 297. See Kristina Furlet, Russia Mulls Whistleblower Reward Law, FCPA 
BLOG (Apr. 16, 2015, 7:28 AM), http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2015/4/16/russia-
mulls-whistleblower-reward-law.html (last visited Jan. 11, 2018) (reporting that 
Russia considered amendments to its anti-bribery law to bring the country’s 
legislation into compliance with international principles and anticorruption 
norms) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 298. See id. (listing the general provisions of the proposed law).  
 299. See Henry Chen, Whistleblowers, East and West, FCPA BLOG (July 23, 
2013, 8:02 AM), http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2013/7/23/whistleblowers-east-
and-west.html (last visited Jan. 11, 2018) (stating that the reward for 
whistleblowers will range from $160 to $4,900 in U.S. currency) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 300. See Hui Zhi, China Whistleblowers Hit Local Obstacles, FCPA BLOG 
(April 23, 2014, 7:08 AM), http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2014/4/23/china-
whistleblowers-hit-local-obstacles.html (last visited Jan. 11, 2018) (“A local party 
leader said failing to stop the petitioners would be considered a serious dereliction 
of duty.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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to report corruption from meeting with inspectors from the Central 
Commission for Discipline.301  
Although European countries are generally considered less 
willing to reward whistleblowers than the United States, in 2014 
the Council of Europe adopted a legal instrument on protecting 
individuals who report information about acts or omissions in the 
workplace that represent a serious threat to the public interest.302 
Also in 2014, the European Parliament and Council adopted a 
market abuse regulation that allows Member States to provide 
financial incentives to persons who offer relevant information 
about potential infringements of the law as long as such persons 
do not have pre-existing duties to report such information, and the 
information is new and results in a successful enforcement 
action.303 In addition, in several European Union (EU) countries, 
                                                                                                     
 301. See id. (“Persistent petitioners are often held in ‘discipline centers’ or 
‘black jails’ and subject to abuses.”); see also Richard L. Cassin, Whistleblowers in 
India Risk Being Murdered, FCPA BLOG (Oct. 20, 2011, 12:28 AM), 
http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2011/10/20/whistleblowers-in-india-risk-being-
murdered.html (last visited Jan. 11, 2018) (stating that whistleblowers who tried 
to expose government corruption have been murdered) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review); Richard L. Cassin, Middle East Rulers Wage 
War On Whistleblowers, FCPA BLOG (Oct. 14, 2011, 6:00 AM), 
http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2011/10/14/middle-east-rulers-wage-war-on-
whistleblowers.html (last visited Jan. 11, 2018) (stating that whistleblowers are 
being jailed and murdered in Oman, Iraq, and Jordan for reporting corruption) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 302. See Recommendation of the Committee of Ministers to Member States on 
the Protection of Whistleblowers, COUNCIL EUR. (Apr. 30, 2014), 
https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?Ref=CM/Rec(2014)7&Language=lanEnglish&Sit
e=CM&BackColorInternet=C3C3C3&BackColorIntranet=EDB021&BackColorL
ogged=F5D383 (last visited Jan. 11, 2018) (recommending that Member States 
have a normative, institutional and judicial framework to protect individuals 
who, in the context of their work-based relationship, report or disclose 
information on threats or harm to the public interest) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review); see also Whistleblowing in Europe: Legal 
Protections for Whistleblowers in the EU, TRANSPARENCY INT’L (Nov. 5, 2013), 
http://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/pub/whistleblowing_in_europe_legal_pro
tections_for_whistleblowers_in_the_eu (last visited Jan. 11, 2018) (stating that 
the Council action followed a Transparency International report in November 
2013 that only four of the Member States offered strong protection to 
whistleblowers from employer retaliation) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review). 
 303. See generally Commission Regulation 596/2014 of Apr. 16, 2014 On 
Market Abuse (Market Abuse Regulation) and Repealing Directive 2003/6/EC of 
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especially in the context of competition law, whistleblowers who 
provide information about cartels in which they were involved may 
be treated as key witnesses and avoid some penalties.304  
Partially in response to the 2014 “LuxLeaks” scandal and the 
2016 revelations in the Panama Papers, the European Parliament 
in 2017 voted to require the European Commission to institute 
stronger protections, albeit without an incentive system, in the EU 
whistleblowing program.305 Several EU countries have or have 
considered anticorruption laws with whistleblower provisions. For 
example, France passed an anticorruption law in November 2016 
that included whistleblowing procedures and some protections 
against retaliation, but no financial incentives.306 In fact, the 
French approach made it clear that the whistleblower should act 
without any self-interest.307  
Of non-U.S. anticorruption measures, perhaps the best known 
is the United Kingdom’s Bribery Act.308 Enacted in 2010, the 
Bribery Act is even more stringent than the FCPA in its 
                                                                                                     
the European Parliament and of the Council and Commission Directives 
2003/124/EC, 2003/125/EC and 2004/72/EC, 2014 O.J. (L 173/1), http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32014R0596 (detailing the 
procedures for reporting infringements and financial incentives to 
whistleblowers). 
 304. See Gregor Thüsing & Gerrit Forst, supra note 289, at 28 (“In lieu of 
monetary incentives, a different form of carrot is made use of in practice within 
the EU: Especially in the field of antitrust regulation.”). 
 305. See Paige Long, Financial Sector Tweaks Made to EU Whistleblower 
Measures, LAW360 (July 20, 2017, 5:31 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/ 
946195/financial-sector-tweaks-made-to-eu-whistleblower-measures (last visited 
Jan. 11, 2018) (stating that the European Parliament published a report on 
suggested amendments to its whistleblowing proposals) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 306. See Xavier Oustalniol, First Look at the Whistleblower Provisions in the 
New French Anti-Corruption Law, FCPA BLOG (Nov. 21, 2016, 8:18 AM), 
http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2016/11/21/xavier-oustalniol-first-look-at-the-
whistleblower-provisions.html (last visited Jan. 11, 2018) (stating that companies 
are now required to implement measures to prevent and detect corruption in 
France of foreign countries or influence peddling) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review).  
 307. See id. (noting that under the French system, there are no financial 
incentives and a whistleblower should act without self-interest, which is contrary 
to the U.S. system).  
 308. 2010, c. 23 (U.K.). 
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prohibition of foreign bribery.309 The United Kingdom considered 
implementing financial incentives for whistleblowers in July 2014, 
but decided against them.310 In a joint report, the UK Financial 
Conduct Authority and the Bank of England Prudential 
Regulation Authority noted that they had reviewed the possibility 
of providing financial incentives, and had visited several U.S. 
regulatory agencies, including the SEC, that administer such 
programs.311 The UK regulators concluded that introducing 
financial incentives would be unlikely to increase the number or 
quality of the disclosures that they receive from whistleblowers.312 
The UK report argued that whistleblower incentives benefit a 
small number of persons and do not lead to an increase in the 
number or quality of disclosures.313 Instead, whistleblower 
incentives were characterized as a complex, costly governance 
structure that trigger significant legal fees and could undermine 
the introduction and maintenance by firms of their own internal 
whistleblower mechanisms.314 In fact, the report listed a number 
of moral and other problems that might result from the imposition 
of an incentive system, including malicious reporting, entrapment, 
conflicts of interest in court, inconsistency of regulators’ 
expectations of firms, the difficulty of agreeing on whistleblower 
qualification criteria, and negative public perceptions.315 
Of particular interest for purposes of this Article was the UK 
assessment and description of the Dodd–Frank program. The 
“Analysis of the US position” noted that, because U.S. awards can 
be made only when information from a whistleblower leads directly 
to a successful regulatory or criminal case and appropriate funds 
are recovered, few whistleblowers are eligible to be considered for 
                                                                                                     
 309. Id. § 6. 
 310. See FIN. CONDUCT AUTH. & BANK OF ENG. PRUDENTIAL REG. AUTH., 
FINANCIAL INCENTIVES FOR WHISTLEBLOWERS 1 (2014) (stating that strong 
measures are needed to encourage and protect whistleblowers, “who can play an 
important role in helping to protect the safety and soundness of firms and to 
prevent and detect wrongdoing”). 
 311. Id.  
 312. Id.  
 313. Id. 
 314. See id. at 2 (listing the report’s key findings on whistleblower incentives).  
 315. Id. at 3.  
CASH FOR YOUR CONSCIENCE 1159 
awards.316 In addition, the UK regulators blamed the U.S. 
statutory confidentiality requirement for preventing U.S. 
regulators from warning firms against retaliation against 
whistleblowers.317 Overall, the UK regulators concluded that none 
of the U.S. agencies that used rewards had seen a significant 
increase in either the number or the quality of reports from 
whistleblowers.318 The UK report concluded: “There is no empirical 
evidence to suggest that the U.S. system raises either the number 
or the quality of whistleblower disclosures within the financial 
services. Nor do the incentives in the U.S. model appear to improve 
the protection available to whistleblowers.”319 Rather than create 
a bounty system, the UK regulators proposed to press ahead with 
regulatory changes necessary to require firms to have effective 
whistleblowing procedures, and to make senior management 
accountable for delivering those procedures.320  
VI. Conclusion: Does it Work? 
A. Do the Dodd–Frank Whistleblower Incentives Increase the 
Quality or Quantity of Tips? 
The UK report conflicts with reports made by the SEC’s Office 
of the Whistleblower and the SEC’s Office of Inspector General 
regarding the impact of the Dodd–Frank whistleblower program. 
The SEC Office of Inspector General (OIG), released its Evaluation 
of the SEC’s Whistleblower Program in January 2013.321 The OIG 
                                                                                                     
 316. See id. at 4 (citing “no more than a handful [of awards granted] since 
Dodd–Frank came into force in July 2010”).  
 317. See id. (determining that under this course of action, there is no 
additional protection for whistleblowers).  
 318. Id. 
 319. Id. at 7. 
 320. See id. (“We consider that providing financial incentives to 
whistleblowers will not encourage whistleblowing or significantly increase 
integrity and transparency in financial markets.”). 
 321. See generally OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. SEC & EXCH. COMM’N, Rep. No. 
511, EVALUATION OF THE SEC’S WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM (2013) [hereinafter 
SEC, EVALUATION OF WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM] (evaluating the whistleblower 
program and offering recommendations for improvement of the program).  
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evaluation concluded that the SEC implementation of the final 
rules made the Dodd–Frank whistleblower program at the SEC 
“clearly defined and user friendly for users that have basic 
securities law, rules, and regulations knowledge.”322 The OIG 
report praised the promotion of the program on the SEC website, 
the Office of the Whistleblower’s outreach efforts and response 
time, and determined that the award levels under the program are 
appropriate.323 
In the SEC’s 2017 Annual Report to Congress on the Dodd–
Frank Whistleblower Program, Office of the Whistleblower Chief 
Jane Norberg reported that “the demonstrable benefits of the 
program continue to materialize.”324 Chief Norberg noted that 
during fiscal year 2017 the Office of the Whistleblower paid twelve 
whistleblowers nearly $50 million, including three of the ten 
highest awards that had been paid to date.325 The SEC went on to 
assert that the program has had a “transformative” effect on the 
agency’s enforcement program, and emphasized the hundreds of 
millions of dollars that have been returned to investors as a 
result.326  
In a July 2014 talk at a corporate governance conference, 
then-SEC Chair Mary Jo White stated that tips from the program 
“have helped the Enforcement Division identify more possible 
fraud and other violations and earlier than would otherwise have 
                                                                                                     
 322. Id. at v. Several scholars have questioned how much knowledge an 
individual must have to realize that a securities law violation, particularly an 
FCPA violation, is taking place. Is this basic common sense, or is the FCPA 
particularly complex and so unlikely to trigger effective tips? See Dave Ebersole, 
Blowing the Whistle on Dodd–Frank Whistleblower Reform, 6 OHIO ST. 
ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 123 (2011) (analyzing the Dodd–Frank whistleblower 
provisions and providing recommendations for the future).  
 323. See SEC, EVALUATION OF WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM, supra note 321, at v 
(“Based on our review of past experience of other whistleblower programs and 
practical concerns in the administration of the program, we determine the SEC’s 
award levels are reasonable and should not change at this time.”). The report also 
rejected the possibility of adding a qui tam provision similar to the one in place 
under the False Claims Act. Id.  
 324. See SEC, 2017 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 16, at 1 (“Whistleblower 
information has aided the SEC’s efforts to uncover and stop fraudulent 
investment schemes.”).  
 325. Id. at 10. 
 326. Id.  
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been possible.”327 In the 2017 Annual Report to Congress, the SEC 
asserted, “[w]histleblowers have provided tremendous value to the 
SEC’s enforcement efforts and significant help to investors,” citing 
the “hundreds of millions of dollars returned to investors as a 
result of actionable information that whistleblower brought to the 
agency.”328  
This may be particularly true in the context of the FCPA. At 
an October 2016 securities law conference, then-SEC FCPA Unit 
Chief Kara Brockmeyer cited whistleblower tips and international 
cooperation as the primary sources of FCPA cases and credited 
both with the record FCPA enforcement of 2016.329  
The Dodd–Frank whistleblower program is growing. The 
number of whistleblower tips under the program has risen every 
year since its establishment.330 The Office of the Whistleblower 
received over 4,400 tips in fiscal year 2017, nearly a 50% increase 
from the program’s first full year in 2012.331 In addition, during 
fiscal year 2017, the SEC returned nearly 3,200 phone calls from 
members of the public.332 Perhaps even more significantly, there is 
a ready supply of attorneys who specialize in representing 
                                                                                                     
 327. Mary Jo White, Chair, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, A Few Things 
Directors Should Know About the SEC, Address at Stanford University Rock 
Center for Corporate Governance Twentieth Annual Stanford Directors’ College 
(June 23, 2014); see also LABATON SUCHAROW, ACHIEVEMENTS, CHALLENGES AND 
CHANGE: THE SEC WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM YEAR IN REVIEW 3 (2014), 
http://www.labaton.com/en/about/press/upload/Achievements-Challenges-and-
Change-SEC-Whistleblower-Program-YIR.pdf (quoting Mary Jo White’s 
address).  
 328. SEC, 2017 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 16, at 1.  
 329. See FCPA Chief Touts Record High Enforcement Actions—Links 
Avoiding a Monitor to Early Remediation of FCPA Issues, BAKER HOSTETLER (Oct. 
17, 2016), https://www.bakerlaw.com/alerts/fcpa-chief-touts-record-high-
enforcement-actions-links-avoiding-a-monitor-to-early-remediation-of-fcpa-issues 
(last visited Jan. 11, 2018) (summarizing Brockmeyer’s remarks during the 
annual Securities Docket Conference on October 13, 2016) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 330. See SEC, 2017 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 16, at 1 (showing that the 
SEC received 224 tips in (partial year) 2011, 3,001 in 2012, 3,238 in 2013, 3,620 
in 2014, 3,923 in 2015, 4,218 in 2016, and 4484 in 2017).  
 331. See id. (citing the increasing number of tips as evidence that awareness 
of the whistleblower program has grown significantly over the years). 
 332. See id. at 8 (stating that many of those phone calls related to the proper 
procedure for submitting tips). 
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whistleblowers, and shepherding them through the SEC process. 
Over half of the award recipients were represented by counsel 
when they initially submitted their tips, and others retained 
counsel either during the subsequent investigation or the award 
process.333 
The SEC is clear that the payment of awards incentivizes 
persons to come forward and provide information,334 and that it 
positively impacts SEC enforcement of the federal securities 
laws.335 
As mentioned above, in fiscal year 2017 the SEC also made 
twelve awards, bringing the annual total to nearly $50 million.336 
By the end of the fiscal year, the SEC had awarded a total of 
approximately $160 million to forty-six whistleblowers in the 
history of the program.337  
The tips received by the Office of the Whistleblower in fiscal 
year 2017 most often detailed violations of rules relating to 
corporate disclosures and financial statements (19%), fraud in 
connection with public offerings (18%), and market manipulation 
(12%).338 However, alleged FCPA violations also account for a 
significant number of the tips each year.339 Of the 4,218 tips 
received in 2016, 238 or 5.6% were FCPA-related.340 Of the 4,484 
                                                                                                     
 333. See id. at 18 (“Whistleblowers seeking an award are not required to be 
represented by counsel unless they choose to file their tips with the Commission 
anonymously.”).  
 334. Id. at 3.  
 335. See id. (“We are proud that the whistleblower program continues to 
positively impact the SEC’s enforcement of the federal securities laws. We are 
confident that it will continue to bolster the agency’s mission of protection of 
investors and the markets in the years ahead.”).  
 336. Id. at 1.  
 337. Id.  
 338. Id. at 24 (providing a chart of the most common complaint categories 
reported by whistleblowers).  
 339. It is worth noting that many of the law firms that specialize in 
whistleblower law have specific information on their website relating to the FCPA 
and explaining that FCPA tips could earn a bounty under the Dodd–Frank 
program. See, e.g., Foreign Bribery Whistleblowers, KATZ, MARSHALL & BANKS 
LLP, http://www.kmblegal.com/resources/foreign-bribery-whistleblowers (last 
visited Jan. 11, 2018) (describing the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 340.  See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, 2016 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS ON 
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tips received in 2017, 210 or 4.7% were FCPA-related.341 As 
discussed above in Part II.B.1, although the SEC’s strictly enforced 
confidentiality requirements make it impossible to confirm 
whether any of the awards corresponded to an FCPA case, press 
reports indicated that at least one of the SEC’s 2016 awards went 
to a BHP Billiton employee reporting an FCPA violation.342  
B. Do the Dodd–Frank Whistleblower Incentives Improve 
Enforcement of the FCPA? 
The Dodd–Frank whistleblower incentive system has the 
potential to increase effective enforcement of the FCPA by 
encouraging whistleblowers to report FCPA violations to the 
SEC.343 2017 was the second-strongest year on record for 
enforcement of the FCPA, as measured by the size and volume of 
recoveries. If more enforcement triggers more compliance, then one 
might think that the Dodd–Frank incentive program will lead to 
more compliance. Fear of SEC investigations and enforcement of 
possible securities law violations, fueled by whistleblowers seeking 
big financial rewards, may make companies increase their 
vigilance against violations of the FCPA. 
Although the incentive award program is relatively small, it 
has been well publicized. The publicity itself may be useful. 
Arguably, the program does not need to pay many awards to have 
an effect on compliance and decrease corruption. As then-Chief 
McKessy pointed out in 2012, even one large FCPA-related 
whistleblower award, if the whistleblower announces it publicly, 
may attract broad public attention and an influx of new tips.344 The 
                                                                                                     
THE DODD–FRANK WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM 23 (2016) (providing a chart of the 
most common complaint categories reported by whistleblowers in 2016).  
 341. See SEC, 2017 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 16, at 24 (providing a chart of 
the most common complaint categories reported by whistleblowers in 2017). 
 342. Supra Part II.B.1.  
 343. But see ETHICS RES. CTR., INSIDE THE MIND OF A WHISTLEBLOWER 14 
(2012) (showing that monetary incentives are the least likely of the methods being 
examined to motivate reporting outside the company). 
 344. See Daniel B. Pickard et al., The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: 2013 
Year-in-Review, 31 INT’L TRADE REP. (BNA) 377 (2014) (“FCPA violations [are] 
increasingly fertile ground for the agency’s whistleblowing program, potentially 
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mere possibility of bounty-hungry whistleblowers may be a strong 
deterrent to corporations contemplating bribery.345  
Yet compliance may increase only marginally. SEC and DOJ 
enforcement of the FCPA has been very high for almost a decade, 
and many companies subject to the law have already made 
substantial and costly upgrades to their internal compliance 
programs.346 It is possible that some companies cannot do much 
more. Even the threat of more whistleblowers may not produce 
significantly more effective compliance programs if companies are 
already doing what they can.347 
Moreover, if the Dodd–Frank program has the effect of 
drawing whistleblowers away from internal reporting channels, 
there is a risk that it may decrease internal reporting, which may 
be suboptimal. Whistleblowers prefer to report internally first.348 
Internal reporting gives companies a chance to remedy a problem, 
                                                                                                     
increasing the importance of self-disclosure of potential violations by 
corporations.”).  
 345. See id. (“[C]ases against individuals have a great deterrent value as they 
drive home to individuals the real consequences to them personally that their acts 
can have.”).  
 346. See id. (stating that “it is more important than ever for companies to 
implement well-tailored anticorruption compliance programs, including 
appropriate due diligence on joint venture partners, international agents and 
other third parties”). Much of this with the help of their attorneys. The resulting 
FCPA compliance industry has been dubbed “FCPA Inc.” by Professor Mike 
Koehler in his writings and on his FCPA Professor site. See Mike Koehler, A 
Common Language to Remedy Distorted Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 
Enforcement Statistics, 68 RUTGERS U. L. REV. 553, 554 (2016) (“At present, 
however, the FCPA’s conversational waters are muddied because this niche 
practice area (often referred to as FCPA Inc.) lacks a lingua franca, or common 
language.”).  
 347. For example, in response to the allegations of bribery by its Mexican 
subsidiary, Wal-Mart instituted an extensive new compliance program, which, by 
the end of 2016, was estimated to have cost $263 million, in addition to the $557 
million investigation it conducted. See Matt Kelly, Walmart FCPA Costs: $820 
Million and Counting, RADICAL COMPLIANCE (Dec. 4, 2016), 
http://www.radicalcompliance.com/2016/12/04/walmart-fcpa-costs-820-million-
counting/ (last visited Jan. 11, 2018) (reporting Wal-Mart’s FCPA costs) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 348. See ETHICS RES. CTR., supra note 343, at 2, 11 (noting that only 2% of 
employees solely go outside the company and never report the wrongdoing they 
have observed to their employer).  
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stopping the FCPA violations right away.349 And internal reporting 
does not raise the vexing conflicts of duties that force the employee 
to choose between loyalty to the employer and civic obligation.350  
SEC statistics, however, suggest that this is not the case, and 
the incentive program is functioning to backstop internal reporting 
systems that have failed. The SEC reports that by the end of fiscal 
year 2017, approximately 62% of whistleblower award recipients 
were insiders in the company with respect to which they reported 
information of wrongdoing.351 Furthermore, “[o]f the award 
recipients who were current or former employees of the entity, 
approximately 83% raised their concerns internally to their 
supervisors or compliance personnel, or understood that their 
supervisor or relevant compliance personnel knew of the 
violations, before reporting their information of wrongdoing to the 
Commission.”352 
Still, there remain objections to the program. For example, by 
imposing the substantial costs of administering the program on the 
SEC,353 the incentive system may divert funds that would be better 
used for enforcement. Or perhaps the incentive system floods the 
SEC with frivolous tips. The SEC is a famously overstretched 
agency, as became painfully clear during the Global Financial 
Crisis and the Madoff scandal.354  
Each year there are huge discrepancies between the number 
of tips reported, the number of enforcement judgments,355 and 
                                                                                                     
 349. See id. at 17 (stating that employees internally report to get a more 
complete picture of the situation and allow the company an opportunity to address 
the issue).  
 350. See id. at 11 (providing that most employees choose to report internally 
based on loyalty and personal relationships with supervisors).  
 351. See SEC, 2017 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 16, at 17 (clarifying that 
despite the fact that a majority of whistleblowers are company insiders, there is 
no requirement that an individual be an employee or company insider to be 
eligible for an award).  
 352. Id.  
 353. See id. at 6 (stating that in addition to the Chief and Deputy Chief, the 
Office of the Whistleblower was staffed with eleven attorneys, four paralegals, 
and an administrative assistant).  
 354. See LIPMAN, supra note 63, at 12 (providing that the SEC failed to 
uncover the Madoff Ponzi scheme for more than twenty years after investors lost 
$65 million).  
 355. See Boyne, supra note 42, at 301–02 (“[S]ome scholars have argued that, 
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number of awards made. No doubt many such tips are without 
merit, and perhaps others are resolved through negotiation. As of 
the end of fiscal year 2017, the SEC had received over 22,000 tips 
but made only forty-six awards based on thirty-seven actions.356 
The low number of tips that lead to awards suggests that the SEC 
simply cannot act on all of the tips it receives.357 And once it decides 
to act, litigation is often slow and expensive, not to mention 
uncertain. 
It is thus conceivable that the Dodd–Frank program could 
have a suboptimal effect on FCPA compliance. Rather than 
attempt to instill a culture of cooperation and voluntary 
compliance, Dodd–Frank may have instituted an expensive policy 
of (occasionally well-paid) internal surveillance.  
C. Conclusion 
As matter of comparative law and social science, however, it is 
difficult to prove that a more cooperative regime would be more 
effective. And, based on history and experience, we know that SOX 
did not prevent the levels of fraud and noncompliance that 
contributed to if not caused the Global Financial Crisis. SOX relied 
largely on internal review structures and assessments and SOX 
evidently failed, or at least the nation endured a great number of 
violations.358 So it is unsurprising that over the years Congress has 
moved from simple prohibitions on fraud to requiring compliance 
programs to offering an incentive system for information. There 
                                                                                                     
by failing to institute a qui tam system or to impose any costs on the 
whistleblower, the Act fails to provide an adequate screening mechanism to 
discourage frivolous tips.”).  
 356. See generally SEC, 2017 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 16, at 16, 23. See 
also Baer, supra note 10, at 2217 (citing a similarly low number of awards at the 
end of 2016 and suggesting that the low “hit rate” of 0.2% results from the fact 
that the strongest tips would come from complicit tipsters, who hesitate to blow 
the whistle because of the risk of self-incrimination). 
 357. See id. at 2218 (suggesting that the SEC may have too much discretion 
in deciding how to handle tips and complaints).  
 358. See Boyne, supra note 42, at 292–93 (“Although the Sarbanes–Oxley Act 
initially appeared to offer whistleblowers an easy path to recover damages, 
empirical evidence suggests that the path was a particularly steep one.”).  
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seems to be a growing consensus, at least in the United States, that 
a strong whistleblower system includes meaningful rewards for 
the whistleblowers.359  
There are also ways to improve or at least increase the scope 
of the incentive award system. Several authors have argued for the 
imposition of a qui tam provision, which would spare 
administrative resources and deputize whistleblowers in a manner 
similar to the FCA.360 Similarly, the SEC could relax the 
$1,000,000 threshold for an eligible action.361 The number seems 
somewhat random, and prevents whistleblowers in smaller 
instances from coming forward.  
Regardless of whether the Dodd–Frank system of 
whistleblower compensation is optimal, however, for the 
foreseeable future it is reasonable to assume that the program will 
pay awards to whistleblowers who report FCPA violations. As long 
as the FCPA is vigorously enforced and illicit payments to foreign 
officials remain a prominent feature of international business, 
whistleblower incentives will remain attractive to regulators. 
Thus, for purposes of FCPA enforcement, bounties for 
whistleblowers are here to stay.  
                                                                                                     
 359. See LIPMAN, supra note 63, at 5 (“Incentives to whistleblowers have been 
increased dramatically as a result of Dodd–Frank and the changes to the Internal 
Revenue Code in December 2006 mandating whistleblower rewards.”). 
 360. See Anthony J. Casey & Anthony Niblett, Noise Reduction: The 
Screening Value of Qui Tam, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 1169, 1175 (2014) (theorizing 
that a whistleblowing program’s ease of entry can swamp an agency with low 
value information, thereby undermining enforcement, while a qui tam action acts 
as a screening tool for complaints). 
 361. See Boyne, supra note 42, at 302 (“This [million dollar] restriction 
deviates from the recovery available to whistleblowers under FCA, as under the 
FCA, whistleblowers may recover their share of the bounty regardless of how 
much the government recovers.”).  
